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This paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation
and the interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship
between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator. This pattern is rationalized
in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount
of surplus to be split with the politician (thereby increasing contributions), but is also correlated with
the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds (thereby decreasing
contributions). The model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing
data on individual and PAC donations and local employment by sector. This procedure yields estimates
of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach
also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election
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The role played by special interest groups in shaping policy-making is hard to ignore. One simple
reason is the considerable size of the amounts the special interest groups (SIGs) inject into the
political system. During the 1999-2000 election cycle the ﬁrst 50 donor industries disbursed to
incumbents of the 106th Congress a cumulated $368,438,170,a b o u tt h es i z eo ft h eG D Po fa( n o t
so) small developing economy. In the 2005-2006 election cycle the ﬁrst 50 donor industries disbursed
the 109th Congress $444,505,353. Much research eﬀort has gone towards understanding the way in
which special interest groups (SIGs) aﬀect the political process and policy formulation, if and how
SIGs buy inﬂuence. In particular, within this literature one speciﬁc path has been to investigate the
importance of campaign contributions by SIGs to politicians who value such donations as inputs
that increase their probability of electoral success.
One aspect that has received little attention along this path of research is that, since the prob-
ability of being (re-)elected ultimately depends on the number of votes a politician can attract,
the legislator should take into account both the electoral strength of an interest group (i.e. the
share of voting population it represents) and its contributing possibilities when deciding whether
to support or not legislation in favor of such group.1 On the one hand, SIGs that represent a large
number of voters in a district also beneﬁt more from a given policy and therefore might contribute
more. On the other hand, such interest groups might be required to make fewer contributions if
they can pledge voter support.2 The ability of employers to aﬀect the electoral orientation of their
1The power of ﬁrms in terms of voter representation has been at the center of discussion following a recent move by
Wal-Mart: “In August, Wal-Mart distributed a letter to its employees in Iowa and three other states, highlighting what
it said were inaccuracies in criticism by Governor Tom Vilsack, as well as Senators Evan Bayh of Indiana and Joseph
Biden of Delaware and New Mexico’s Governor Bill Richardson. The letter encouraged employees to talk to ‘friends,
neighbours and family about the good that Wal-Mart does’. It also promised that the company would ‘keep you informed
about what these political candidates are saying about your company while on the campaign trail’. Wal-Mart has also
highlighted the signiﬁcant number of its employees in both swing states. In Ohio its 50,000 workers represent roughly 1
per cent of voters in the 2004 presidential election, enough to be a factor in the current Senate battle between Sherrod
Brown - a Wal-Mart critic - and Mike DeWine, the Republican incumbent. Wal-Mart’s political action committee is
also one of the largest corporate donors to Mr DeWine’s campaign.” (Financial Times - September 30, 2006)
2The idea that politicians may accept lower contributions by ﬁrms that represent a large number of voters is
clearly expressed in the following interview to Representative Guy Vander Jagt (R-Michigan): “Ih a v eo n eF o r t u n e
500 company in my district that was so fuddy-duddy that they would never ever, ever do anything to help me. If their
plane was going back to Michigan, they wouldn’t let me ride on it. And that was before we got all these rules in.
N o b o d yw o u l dd oi tn o w[ a c c e p tar i d eo nac o r p o r a t ej e t ] ,b u tb a c kt h e n ,e v e r y o n ew o u l dd oi t .W h e nt h eW a s h i n g t o n
Senators were still here, instead of [this company] getting me tickets, I’d scramble around and get them tickets. In
other words, I could not have been treated more shabbily in terms of anything they might do for me. And yet I always
2employees is illustrated by initiatives like the NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) Pros-
perity Project, which provides employers with the tools to inform workers of how their legislators
are voting on issues of concern to their sector. 3
This turns out to be a quantitatively important mechanism at play in the data. The main
contribution of the paper is to show that the number of voters represented by interest groups is an
important variable in explaining the pattern of campaign contributions. The data indicate that an
inverted-U shape describes the relationship between the share of voters represented by an interest
group and the contributions to a legislator.
As a departure point, the paper exploits the variation in economic structure across US states
and congressional districts to investigate the relationship between the electoral strength of a given
interest group and the political contributions to a given politician. For each US House Representa-
tive and each Senator, we match PAC and individual contributions by each economic interest group
(e.g. tobacco, insurance, steel producers, textiles) to the number of employees in the corresponding
sector.4 We ﬁnd that, within each Congressional District and each State, an inverted-U describes
the relationship between campaign contributions and the number of employees in the sector repre-
sented by the corresponding interest group. At low employment levels (i.e. fewer voters), interest
group contributions to the politician increase with the number of employees in a sector. At higher
employment levels the interest group contributions decrease with the number of employees. Indeed,
the data show that the largest employers are practically never the largest contributors. This pattern
knocked myself out for them because they were the biggest employer in that county. Their health was essential to the
health of my constituents, the people who worked there.” - Speaking Freely by Martin Schram for the Center for
Responsive Politics (1995, First Edition)
The following quote by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona) clariﬁes further the concept: “If I get a contribution
from, say, Allied-Signal, a big defense contractor, and they’ve raised money for me. And then they come in and say,
‘Senator, we need legislation that would extend some rule of contracting that’s good for us.’ They lay out the case.
My staﬀ goes over it. I’m trying to help them. Why am I trying to help them? The cynic can say: ‘Well, it’s because
they gave you 5,000 bucks. And if you ran again, they’ll give you another 5,000 bucks.’ Or is it because they have
15,000 jobs in Arizona and this will help keep those jobs in Arizona? Now to me, the far greater motivation is those
jobs, because those are the people that are going to vote for me. But I can’t ignore the fact that they have given me
money... Now the ideal situation is if I was motivated only by the jobs and the merits and there was no money here -
that’s the way it ought to be - or if the money was so minimal that nobody would think it was a factor. If I could only
spend a half a million dollars in a Senate campaign and they could only give me $1,000, it would not be a factor.”
3See the project web site at http://www.bipac.net/page.asp?content=nam&g=nam&parent=p2demo.
In 2004 NAM reports “By Election Day, the program reached more than 19 million employees, delivered more than
40 million messages and helped 1.7 million employees with voter registration and early ballot information.”
4It seems reasonable to proxy the number of voters an interest group represents with the number of employees in
the sector.
3is robust to a battery of speciﬁcations and controls and, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
explored before in the literature on political contributions. Furthermore, we believe this framework
highlights a channel of inﬂuence at work in a wider sample than the one we consider here. For
instance, several surveys of legislators indicate AARP as the most inﬂuential special interest group
in Washington. AARP gives $0 of political contributions by statute. These two facts cannot be
reconciled by standard models of lobbying, but they are rationalized in the framework we present,
given the large fraction of voters represented by the elderly.
From a theoretical standpoint, we interpret the evidence by modeling the interaction between
heterogenous interest groups in a district and a politician in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining
framework, which illustrates the eﬀects of interest group size on the amount of campaign contri-
butions. Each interest group bargains with its representative over the latter’s support for a policy
favorable to the SIG and over the amount of contributions and voter support by the interest group.
The politician is interested in ensuring support because it faces electoral uncertainty and aims at
increasing the probability of winning by trading legislation support for (i) a guaranteed number of
votes by individuals members of the SIG’s and (ii) contributions that are then employed to aﬀect
the decision of impressionable voters through advertising. The size of the interest group aﬀects
the bargaining because: (i) a larger interest group beneﬁts more from a given favorable policy and
must therefore give larger contributions, (ii) a larger interest group can ensure the legislator a wide
support in the sense of persuading the voters it represents to vote in favor of the politician and
therefore it might not be required to contribute as much, if it suﬃciently increases the probability
of winning of the politician by just committing the support of its members.
The model delivers a structural relationship between votes and contributions, which we estimate,
thus obtaining a measure of the rate at which politicians transform contributions into votes, of the
degree of electoral uncertainty, and of the implicit ability of politicians to support legislation in
favor of interest groups. We employ our results to make four points.
First, according to our parameter estimates, each politician expects to be spending between
$100 and $400 in order to assure an additional vote through advertising and other forms of cam-
paigning. Levitt (1994) ﬁnds that campaign spending has a small impact on electoral outcomes5,
or equivalently, that to obtain on average one more vote politicians need to spend a large amount
of money. Interpreting Levitt’s estimates in this direction yields a cost of $130 − $390 per vote.
Our estimates, though the result of a diﬀerent empirical approach, are of the same magnitude.
5The impact is also not signiﬁcantly positive, but here we simply make use of his point estimates to illustrate the
comparison.
4Second, we relate our estimates of the cost of a vote to the density of population ﬁnding that
more urbanized districts have a higher cost of votes. This result is consistent with ﬁndings in
Stratmann (2004), who reports that some districts have a higher cost of media advertising. If we
think that cities like New York have both high density and high cost of media advertising then the
positive correlation we obtain can be rationalized.
Third, the estimates of ex ante electoral uncertainty are compared to measures of lopsidedness
using ex-post vote margins. We ﬁnd that in districts where electoral races are closer (ex-post victory
margin is thin) our estimates indicate higher ex-ante uncertainty. Analogously, for races that are
considered more lopsided our estimates indicate lower ex-ante variance.
Fourth, by considering the electoral support oﬀered by an interest group along with its contribu-
tions, we are able to recalculate the return to political ‘investment’, broadly deﬁned and we assess
its magnitude. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) provide a comprehensive review of
the discussion surrounding the question of whether returns to political contributions are too high
(implying that contributions should be several orders of magnitude higher) or too low (implying
that we should observe very little contributions). The very nature of this question presupposes
that contributions are similar to an investment decision and that interest groups are buying favors
at some implicit price. The conclusion that Ansolabehere et al. reach is that if contributions
were truly an investment decision then we should observe higher levels of monetary support, as
their returns appear considerably higher than other types of investment. Therefore, they claim,
contributions must rather be a form of consumption. We argue that in order to calculate the re-
turn to contributions one needs to take into account that interest groups give votes (which can be
translated into money) and money.6 The method we propose delivers considerably lower (and more
reasonable) returns.
Relation to previous literature
The literature on campaign ﬁnancing is vast.7 The models that have been proposed in the
literature attribute to political contributions diﬀerent motivations and consequences. We will focus
on those papers that are more relevant to this study here, with the full knowledge that this review
is far from complete.
Various theoretical models have identiﬁed reasons why contributions are given and how they
are used. According to these models contributions are given in order to (i) aﬀect the policy choice
6So an extra dollar would earn return on a larger denominator and not the return found by simply dividing the
value of political favors by the amount of dollar contributions.
7A recent and detailed survey is provided by Stratmann (2005).
5of an incumbent government (Grossman and Helpman, 19948), (ii) to inﬂuence the platform of
political candidates (Grossman and Helpman, 19969), (iii) to increase the likelihood of election of a
candidate with a given (i.e. non-ﬂexible) favorable position (Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Morton
and Myerson, 1992) or (iv) to buy access (Austen-Smith, 1995). Politicians ﬁnd those contributions
useful because campaign spending can be used to inform voters of a candidate position (Austen-
Smith, 1987) or to convince them of the candidate’s quality (Coate, 2004).
Empirical studies of mechanisms (i) and (ii) have found some eﬀect of contributions on voting
behavior on speciﬁc pieces of legislation10 although others have not.11 In this paper, we assume
contributions are valued by politicians and therefore aﬀect legislators’ votes on certain bills. Eﬀect
(iii) is hard to distinguish empirically from eﬀect (ii), but many studies have nevertheless tried
to assess the impact of a given candidate spatial position on the contributions raised (Poole and
Romer, 1985; Poole, Romer and Rosenthal, 1987; McCarty and Poole,1998). Ansolabehere, Snyder,
and Tripathi (2002) and references therein discuss eﬀect (iv)12.
Whether the politicians’ perception that contributions can indeed aﬀect voters decisions is
justiﬁed has been the subject of very close empirical scrutiny. This literature has pursued the
goal of quantifying the impact of campaign spending on the share of votes obtained in the election
(Jacobson, 1978; Green and Krasno, 1988, Palda and Palda, 1998). The diﬃcult task faced by
this literature has been to control for other variables that aﬀect electoral outcomes and that might
therefore bias the estimate of the impact of spending. A few studies have addressed this issue
using diﬀerent techniques and obtaining diﬀerent results (Levitt, 1994; Milligan and Rekkas, 2006,
Erikson and Palfrey, 1998). This paper is not going to address the issue directly, but it oﬀers an
implicit way of estimating the monetary value of a vote, which is just another way of expressing
how much money is needed to ‘inﬂuence’ an additional voter. Our methodology, using within-
district data, is not subject to bias coming from unobserved candidate characteristics because such
8Grossman and Helpman (1994) study the impact of political contribution on trade policy determination, but the
electoral process is not modeled and contributions are assumed to increase the utility of politicians.
9In Grossman and Helpman (1996) political candidates have a given position on some issues, but their platform on
other topics can be aﬀected by contributions (valued as a tool to gather votes). Interest groups have two goals in giving
contributions: inﬂuencing the platform of candidates and aﬀecting the probability of winning of those candidates that
are ex-ante aligned with them. In this paper, policy is taken to be exogenously given for the individual candidate,
who has the choice of supporting it or not. This is a realistic assumption when we analyze the case of an individual
politician during a given legislature.
10Baldwin and Magee (1998), Stratmann (2002)
11Ansolabehere et al. (2003) report a number of studies that have found mixed results in support of this hypothesis.
12The authors also have a relevant discussion of the relationship between size of the SIG’s membership and access
to politicians for AARP, Business Round Table, and other groups.
6characteristics are constant at the district level. Admittedly we cannot perform the same exercise
as the previous studies, but we can obtain an estimate for the implicit cost of a vote that is free of
individual candidate bias.
Another strand of research has focused on identifying the strategy of interest groups in terms of
choice of timing and recipients of contributions. Several papers have found committee assignments
and constituency characteristics to be important determinants of interest group donations, both
theoretically and empirically (Grier and Munger, 1991; Denzau and Munger, 1986; Stratmann,
1991). Generally, the view in these studies is that interest groups at the national level decide
where to allocate a given amount of money according, for instance, to whether the legislator’s
constituents’ interests are or not aligned with the interest group. The view that we take in this
paper is to consider an individual politician and abstract from the national interest group allocation
problem.
There is also relevant political science research on the role of groups as vote providers and
turnout, which include both theoretical and empirical contributions. For the former, see Morton
(1987, 1991), Schram (1990), Uhlaner (1989). For the latter, see Filer, Kenny, and Morton (1993)
and Nalebuﬀ and Shachar (1999).
The study that comes closest to what we do in this paper is Stratmann (1992). Stratmann looks
at the relationship between farm PAC contributions in a given district and the fraction of farm
population in that congressional district13.H eﬁnds that farm PAC contributions are low for those
legislators whose district has a low fraction of rural population (approximately below the median
for the country) suggesting that, according to Stratmann, those politicians are ‘too costly’ to bring
to the farm cause because they do not have support for those policies from their constituency14.
Stratmann also ﬁnds that, conditional on the fraction being (approximately) above the median,
contributions ﬁrst decrease in farm population (because politicians with larger farm constituencies
care more about farming and need to be compensated less for supporting farming-favorable policies),
but then increase. Stratmann explains that the latter eﬀect is suggestive of the fact that politicians
with large farming constituencies are the ones with the highest productivity in pushing legislation
that is pro-farming and therefore PACs that try to maximize their return should invest more heavily
in them. Although this paper primarily focuses on the interaction between a politician and interest
13Rural fraction is used as a proxy for the fraction of population with some interest in policies favorable to
farming. This measure is also taken to proxy the position of the speciﬁc legislator about issues concerning farming,
independently of campaign contributions.
14An interest group interested in guaranteeing that the majority of legislators will support a given policy, will try
to inﬂuence the ‘least costly’ half of the legislature.
7groups in his electoral district, in Section 3 we discuss the relationship between our results and
Stratmann’s regressions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and presents the
reduced-form evidence. Section 3 presents a model of bargaining between the legislator and interest
groups and derives a structural relationship between votes and money. Section 4 presents the
estimation procedure and the structural estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Presentation of the data and reduced-form estimation
This section presents the data on the number of voters pertaining to each special interest group and
the amount of political contributions to each legislator by each interest group. The data come from
two sources. Data on local employment by sector are contained in the Country Business Patterns
database, an annual series15 published by the U.S. Census Bureau, which provides U.S. county-level
employment16 by 6-digit NAICS.17 The county-level data is aggregated to the congressional district
level and the state level using the MABLE-Geocorr software.18
Campaign contributions data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) ﬁles are collected
and aggregated by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). The CRP classiﬁes Political Action
Committee (PAC) contributions and individual contributions according to the industry to which the
PAC or the individual donor is associated1920. We use the subset of groups identiﬁed by the CRP
15The series excludes data on self-employed individuals, employees of private households, railroad employees, agri-
cultural production employees, and most government employees.
16The Business Register database contains information about every known establishment in the United States. The
information on employment is summarized in CBP by establishment size bracket.
17In this paper we employ the 1989-90 and 1999-2000 issues.
18Supported by the Missouri Census Data Center. Whenever counties are split between two congressional districts,
we utilize the following methodology to allocate employment to the two districts. Consider county i,p a r to fw h i c h
lies in congressional district d and part in d
0.D e ﬁne as POPidand POP id0 the population of county i in districts d
and d





POP id+POP id0 .
19FEC regulation requires the disclosure of the donor’s employer.
20Noticeably, the approach followed by the CRP may induce a form of measurement error in the data if voters’
contributions are unrelated to the economic SIGs inferred from employment data (for instance, because donors are
driven exclusively by ideological concerns). This would clearly induce attenutation bias in the data, moving against
the mechanism we present. As we report in what follows, attenuation bias does not seem to be a ﬁrst-order issue,
given the quantitative strenght and precision of our estimates.
Finally, the absence of generalized information concerning aﬃliation to non-economic interest groups prevents
us from extending the analysis beyond economic SIGs. The eﬀects we describe however directly generalize to any
instance in which groups have non-zero electoral mass.
8for which we have employment data and match the CRP interest groups to 6-digit NAICS sectors21
using the deﬁnitions reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. The 86 SIG’s and the corresponding
NAICS industries are listed in Table 1. For each SIG we have contributions to each member of the
Senate and the House of Representatives for the 101st (election cycle 1989-90) and 106th Congress
(election cycle 1999-2000). Data collected by the CRP have been extensively employed in the
politico-economic literature22.
As additional controls, data concerning electoral districts and elections are obtained from the
Oﬃce of Clerk of the House (for election results) and the Poole and Rosenthal’s voteview data
base23 (for names, party aﬃliation, and characteristics of congressmen and senators). Finally, in
order to remove the largest outliers we winsorize contributions and number of workers at the 99th
percentile of the right-end tail of the pooled densities of each variable.
We now proceed to gauge the qualitative features of the data. Our starting point is to present
evidence of a non-monotonic, inverted-U pattern between contribution and SIG’s employment sizes.
We present evidence of this empirical regularity in Table 2. The table is divided in three sections,
corresponding to the House, the Senate, and the subgroup of Senators running for reelection at
the two sampling dates of November 2000 and 199024 respectively. The dependent variables of
interest are contributions by each SIG s in district d, which corresponds more directly to Csd,
and, in alternative, the fraction of all contributions received by a politician from each SIG. The
independent variable, vsd,i st h ef r a c t i o n 25 of total population of total employment in district d
represented by sector s. The four speciﬁc a t i o n st h a tw ee s t i m a t ei nT a b l e2a r e :
(col. 1) Csd = φ + δ1vsd + µsd
(col. 2) Csd = φ + δ1vsd + κd + ψs + µsd
(col. 3) Csd = φ + δ1vsd + δ2v2
sd + µsd
(col. 4) Csd = φ + δ1vsd + δ2v2
sd + κd + ψs + µsd.
The ﬁrst two speciﬁcations presented account for a linear relationship between the number of voters
represented by a given SIG and its contributions to a given legislator. A parametric (quadratic)
polynomial is the simple but ﬂexible approximation that we employ in columns (3) and (4). In
21For the 2000 data. For the 1990 data we match the CRP groups to 4-digit SIC (1987 version) industries.
22Among the others see Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, Snyder (2003) and de Figueiredo and Silverman (2004).
23Initially from Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
24The House is renewed every two years, while the Senate is staggered in electoral classes of size 1/3 every two
years. The term in oﬃce of representatives is therefore two years, relative to six years for Senators.
25We utilize shares of total population in order to account for possible diﬀerences in the size of the diﬀerent polities.
This is not particularly important for the House, but it is relevant for the Senate.
9order to partial out unobserved sector-speciﬁc and politician-speciﬁc characteristics, we pool across
districts all the observations for each branch of Congress and include both sector and legislator
ﬁxed eﬀects. We include the ﬁxed eﬀects in columns (2) and (4).
The linear speciﬁcations indicate a positive correlation between contributions and size of the
lobby, δ1 > 0, that is robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects that is signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence
levels. Such relationship holds for the House and the Senate in 1990 and 2000, indicating a consistent
pattern over time and across Congressional branches. As expected the relationship is stronger in
the subgroup of Senators up for reelection in November 2000.
More interestingly Table 2 shows that the pooled regression indicates a hump-shaped relation-
ship between votes and contributions: the parameters present a positive sign on the linear term and
negative on the quadratic (δ1 > 0 and δ2 < 0) and are always statistically signiﬁcant, whether we
include the ﬁxed eﬀects or exclude them. In order to give quantitative intuition the table reports
also the point of maximum and the number of observations above the point of maximum of the
parabola implied by the estimated coeﬃcients. For the House the peak is located between 1.4 and 3
percent of the overall district population. In a congressional district of size approximately 600,000
it corresponds to a SIG employing between 8,400 and 18,000 workers. This number is particularly
reasonable considering that the margin of victory in the 2000 House elections was on average about
80,000−90,000 voters, implying a pivotal group size around 40,000−45,000 voters. As we could
have expected, the number of observations above the point of maximum is not very large. Within
each district there are never too many relatively large voter groups (the distribution of industry
sizes is well approximated by a Pareto distribution)26. Furthermore, understanding the behavior
of the function over the rightmost portion of the size range is important. Large employers are
particularly interesting since they cover a substantial portion of the electorate.
For the Senate the peak of the inverted-U is located between 1.1 and 3.97 percent of the
State population. Senatorial races operate over substantially larger constituencies and the number
of lobbies large enough to exercise electoral pressure could diﬀer from that for the House. This
notwithstanding, the data seem to support an hump-shaped relationship for Senatorial races as well,
especially for those Senators that had completed their fund-raising and were running for reelection
in 2000 and 1990 (part 3 of Table 2).
We now proceed in further detail conditioning along the two main dimensions of the data (by
district and by sector). Table 3(a) reports the results for the coeﬃcients of interest after removing
26It is also mechanically impossible to have many relatively large sectors since their fractions of total employment
h a v et oa d du pt oo n e .
10the assumption of common behavior of the polynomial approximation across districts, while 3(b)
reports within-sector results. Within each district we estimate the equation:
Csd = κd + δd,1vsd + δd,2v2
sd + µsd, (1)
and we consider the overall distributions of various test statistics (sign, 0.05 F-test, 0.05 and 0.10
t-tests). We ﬁnd that δd,1 > 0 and δd,2 < 0 (i.e. the relationship between votes and contributions
exhibit an inverted-U shape) in almost all the districts27 and such pattern is signiﬁcant at least at
the 10 percent level generally in half the seats for all our samples28.
A reasonable insight that we obtain from this table is that heterogeneity across congressional
and senatorial races is quantitatively relevant. The ﬁtted parabolas in column (1) change from
district to district considerably. For instance, albeit the estimated mean peak of the parabola for
the House in 2000 was 0.018, the standard deviation across district was almost as high (0.013).
In the section devoted to structural estimation we devote considerable attention to what speciﬁc
characteristics of the races may determine the pattern of contributions. The approach of Table
3(a) operates within politician by construction and does not allow accounting for unobserved SIG’s
characteristics that might be correlated with sector size and could be inducing certain levels of
contributions. In column (2) we control for the value added of the sector in 2000, as computed by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, to obviate such design problem. The results of column (1) are
broadly conﬁrmed. We can reject at 5 p e r c e n tt h ej o i n th y p o t h e s i so fδ1d =0and δ2d =0for more
than 2/3 of the districts. Column (3) of Table 3(a) repeats the analysis excluding from the sample
four particular sectors29 exhibiting often a large employment level and a low level of contributions
and that might be suspected of driving the results (notice that from column 1 and 2 an average
between 5.3 and 6.2 SIG’s locate on the declining portion of the parabola). The results do not
change substantially once we exclude those four observations. In fact, the results suggest that
there is variation on which sectors belong to the declining portion of the parabola (their number
varies between 3.7 and 5.2).
Table 3(b) reports the results for the coeﬃcients of interest after removing the assumption of
27Congressional districts for the House and States for the Senate.
28We perform three types of tests on the subset of districts that present point estimates δd,1 > 0 and δd,2 < 0.
First we test whether we can reject the null hypothesis that jointly δd,1 = δd,2 =0at the 5% conﬁdence level. Second
we test whether we can reject the null hypothesis that separately δd,1 =0and δd,2 =0at the 5% conﬁdence level.
Finally we repeat this second test at the 10% conﬁdence level.
29The SIG excluded are Retail Sales, Hospitals and Nursing Homes, Food and Beverage, Restaurants and Drinking
Establishments.
11common behavior of the polynomial approximation across sectors. Within each sector we estimate:
Csd = hs + δs,1vsd + δs,2v2
sd + µsd,
and report tests on the signs of δs,1 and δs,2 similarly to the case of district-level regressions. We
ﬁnd that for about two thirds of the sectors δs,1 < 0 and δs,2 > 0. In about half the sectors such
pattern is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level30 in the House, while the results for the Senate are less
conclusive, mostly due to the fact that we are not distinguishing between Senate seats that are up
for vote and those that are not.
An intuitive check for the nonmonotonicity documented in the previous tables is that by and
large the largest employers should not be the largest contributors both within districts and within
industries. It turns out they are not. Table 4 presents evidence of this ﬁnding. In the ﬁrst panel
of Table 4 we ﬁrst report the number of districts in which the largest employer in that district is
the top contributor and we ﬁnd that this is the case for less than 2% of the districts31. The second
line in the same panel reports the number of districts in which the top 5 percent (ventile) of sectors
is the largest contributor. This condition is realized in less than 4% of districts. A monotonic
increasing relationship between money and votes can hardly be reconciled with these ﬁgures. The
second panel of Table 4 repeats the same calculation considering the distribution of contributions
across districts for a given sector. We ﬁnd that the largest employer in a sector is also the largest
contributor in generally less than 7% of sectors. This fraction increases when considering the case
of the top ventile of districts within each sector: the top 5 p e r c e n te m p l o y m e n tg r o u pi st h et o p
contributor in 18% to 37% of the cases. In the majority of instances sectors do not pay the largest
contributions where their employment is the largest. We report the same type of evidence in Figure
1 where the employment size of the largest contributor is plotted against the employment size of
the largest employer within a district (Figure 1a, for 106th and 101st House) and within a sector
(Figure 1b). If contributions were increasing in employment size then all observations should lie
along the 45◦ line, but we observe that the large majority of the observations lie strictly above such
line. The graphs provide a snapshot of the size dispersion of the largest contributors as well.
As additional checks we report two important robustness extensions in Appendix Tables A1
and A2. Tables 2 and 3 do not allow for any role of electoral challengers. We consider this in
Table A1. Large incumbency advantages are a robust feature of US Congressional elections and
challengers usually garner relatively small amounts of resources for elections. Nonetheless, some
30We perform an F-test with a null hypothesis of δs,1 =0and δs,2 =0on the subset of sectors where we ﬁnd
coeﬃcient point estimates that point to a hump.
31All the data used in table 4 and the graphs are not winsorized in order to properly compute frequencies.
12special interests contribute to challengers, either exclusively or jointly with incumbents/favorites.
Table A1 shows that considering the contributions to incumbents net of challengers’ contributions
does not change the frequency and robustness of the non-monotonicity that we report in the data
in any signiﬁcant way. As a second check we consider the case where SIGs may not deliver all their
votes to only one candidate. To address this we split the SIG’s votes proportionally to the splitting
of the SIG’s contributions across the two diﬀerent candidates32. Table A2 shows the robustness of
the results along this dimension. This speciﬁc way of controlling for SIG’s vote-splitting does not
change the frequency and robustness of the non-monotonicity.
By and large the reduced-form evidence tends to support the idea of a non-monotonic relation-
ship between number of SIG’s voters and SIG’s contributions. This particular feature of the data is
novel to the best of our knowledge and surprisingly robust. In the next section we present a model
of the interaction between a legislator and several interest groups that rationalizes the results.
3 The model
This section presents a formal description of the game between politicians and SIGs. An initial
caveat is in order. The model is rigged toward empirical estimation and as such it is simpliﬁed
(radically) along several dimensions. Being critical of our own approach, we require cross-checking.
First, whenever restrictive assumptions are made, we show how the empirical results are aﬀected
by relaxing them. Second, we check our structural estimates against information external to the
model: parameter estimates should appear unreasonable if the model’s assumptions are excessively
restrictive.
3.1 Structure of the polity
Legislature and policy choice
Consider a jurisdiction where the population is divided into D equally sized electoral districts.
The parliament is formed by D legislators, each representing an electoral district d, d =1 ,...,D.
The task of the legislature is to pass or reject a set of policies. In order to simplify matters we
disregard the agenda-setting stage and consider the decision of each legislator d to vote in favor
or against each of the exogenously proposed policies. We do not model the interaction among the
legislators and the determination of the national policy since we are interested in the district-level
32Given the absence of turnout and electoral data by SIGs, we are constrained by addressing the matter indirectly
in Table A2.
13interaction between the incumbent legislator and the set of local interest groups, in view of future
electoral competition between the incumbent and a challenger.
Special interest groups
The economy is divided into S sectors producing goods or services. For the purpose of this
model a sector s in electoral district d is a group of capital owners and workers, which share a
common interest in policies that favor the sector.33 In each electoral district d the economy is
characterized by a diﬀerent size distribution of sectors. The size of interest group s in electoral
district d is represented by the number of workers/voters in the sector: vsd (the set of all voters who
have some stakes in policies that favor the sector). We indicate with the vector y =( y1,y 2,...,y S)
the set of policies proposed by the agenda setter. Policy ys might be an industry-speciﬁc subsidy
or tariﬀ, which increases the rent of interest group s. We assume that the beneﬁt of the lobby
depends only on the aggregate income of the interest group. Ignoring for now the role played by
contributions, the income of the interest group depends on the beneﬁtf r o mp o l i c yys.W ea l l o wt h e
beneﬁtf r o mys to depend on the size of the interest group and the ability of the politician. Interest
group size matters because, for example, the beneﬁt created by a subsidy given to an industry is
increasing in the size of the industry. By allowing the beneﬁt to depend on the speciﬁc politician,
we want to capture the idea that more experienced legislators are more likely to be eﬀective at
supporting a piece of legislation and increase the size of the beneﬁt to the interest group they agree
to support. For simplicity let us assume that in the absence of policy ys the rent of the interest
group is zero.34 The expected utility of interest group s, denoted by Usd is therefore:
Usd = γd + ρdvsd + εsd
where ρd and γd are the legislator-speciﬁc parameters and εsd is a random component that
might depend on the speciﬁc ability of a politician to support a particular sector.
We assume that agents with a stake in sector s act as a uniﬁed special interest group vis-á-vis
the district legislator.35 Since this paper focuses on the interaction between interest groups and
33Although we recognize that the interests of workers and capital owners might not always coincide, we here focus
on policies for which they are suﬃciently aligned.
34Members of the interest group might have other sources of income, which do not depend on the policy imple-
mented. We disregard them here.
35We will be interchangeably use the expression (special) interest group and lobby, even though the word lobbyist
would more strictly identify individuals that act on behalf of interest groups and do not necessarily decide on the
amount of political contributions. Lobbyists are more likely to channel information to the legislators while interest
groups decide independently to make campaign contributions (through their PAC’s, for example, in the United
States).
14politicians, it seems plausible to abstract from coordination problems among individuals belonging
to an interest group. Since Olson (1965) contribution, a large literature has tried to identify
the characteristics that exacerbate the free-rider problem within groups that pursue a common
objective. We assume that when the group decides to vote for a given politician no individual
defects (defection is typically due to costly eﬀort or any other private cost of voting).
In this paper we concentrate on the interaction between a legislator and its constituents, that
is interest groups located in the electoral district. While we recognize that interest groups are able
to organize at the national level, it is common to observe that national associations promoting
special interests are divided into local chapters, which interact more closely with their respective
legislator.36 The importance of this local dimension of the interaction between interest groups and
politicians is testiﬁed by the predominance of in-state versus out-of-state political contributions for
the majority of politicians.37 Although the model can be extended to the simultaneous interaction
between legislators and lobbies at the national level, we choose not to pursue this avenue of research
here as it would greatly complicate the empirical estimation of the game by making the SIG’s payoﬀs
functions of the payoﬀs and the bargaining outcomes in all districts.38
36It is also the case that many companies have their own PAC’s. So another interpretation is that companies
located in a district interact mainly with their legislator.
37For the electoral cycle 1995-96 the median of the percentage of in-state contributions as a fraction of the total is
80% while the mean is 74%.
38It is however interesting to address the question of how our results relate to previous research, particularly Strat-
mann (1992), focusing on a national lobby allocating resources across politicians. Stratmann considers a speciﬁc sector
and explores the relationship between the number of employees in diﬀerent districts and the amount of contributions
given to each legislator. This is similar to our within-sector analysis, which we can perform on 86 (or 84 depending
on the year) sectors (Stratmann only considers 1 sector, farming). Taking this standpoint, within-district results
should be the byproduct of the relationship between SIG’s and politicians at the national level. Five observations are
in order when comparing Stratmann’s results and ours. 1) As mentioned above, contributions are overwhelmingly a
local phenomenon. Out-of-state contributions are a small minority. 2) When comparing within-district and within-
sector results in Table 3, within-district results seem to present stronger evidence of a non-monotonic relationship
than within-sector results. 3) Taking Stratmann’s model seriously, one should not observe positive contributions for
districts where a sector’s employment size is smaller than the median (given majority voting in Congress). This
would not strictly hold if there is uncertainty about politicians’ behavior, so Stratmann does expect to observe some
positive contributions even for observations below the median. However, the amount of contributions for observations
below the median is too large for such interpretation: about 40 percent of total sector’s contributions on average. 4)
We ﬁnd that the peak of contributions is generally well above the median (above the 3rd quartile) and not around
the median. 5) Stratmann argues that for observations with employment levels above the median the relationship
between votes and contributions should be ﬁrst decreasing (politicians that have aligned interests have to be paid less)
a n dt h e ni n c r e a s i n g( p o l i t i c i a n sw i t ha l i g n e di n t e r e s t e da r em o r ep r o d u c t i v ea n ds h o u l db ep a i dm o r e ) .W ed on o t
ﬁnd generalized evidence of a spike in contributions for the highest levels of employment in nonparametric analysis
15Voters
Like Baron (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) we consider two types of voters, the
informed and the uninformed.D i ﬀerently from these papers, the informed voters here are identiﬁed
by their occupation and general economic interests. In this paper the set of informed voters also
corresponds with the members of the interest groups, broadly deﬁned as the set of individuals with
some stake in the sector. Therefore the number of informed voters in a district corresponds to
the sum of the individuals employed in each sector, vsd, in that district. The informed voters’
only concern is whether the proposed policy which beneﬁts their sector, is supported by the elected
politician (and subsequently passed by the legislature). Interest groups can inﬂuence the incumbent
to vote in favor of their preferred policy not only by promising support of the informed voters in
the sector, but by also making political contributions which in turn can be used by the candidate
in the election campaign to aﬀect the decision of uninformed voters.
Uninformed voters are not inﬂuenced by the position of the candidates on the speciﬁcp o l i c y
vector y, but some of them can be aﬀected by the amount of advertising and other campaign ex-
penditures undertaken by the candidates and directed to them. We deﬁne the set of uninformed
voters that responds to advertising as impressionable uninformed voters while the remaining un-
informed voters are deﬁned as non-impressionable uninformed voters. For simplicity we assume
that for each dollar spent on campaigning, the incumbent obtains the vote of αd impressionable
uninformed voters with certainty (alternatively, the ‘cost’ of an additional vote is 1
αd). Conversely
we assume that there is uncertainty over the behavior of non-impressionable uninformed voters: the
incumbent (and members of special interest groups) does not know how many of those uninformed
voters will turn up on election day and how many will vote for him or his challenger. The nature
of the uncertainty is described in the next subsection.
The incumbent legislator
The incumbent legislator in district d is concerned with winning the election (or re-election) so
her expected utility UI






and some exogenous factor ξd:
UI






Let us indicate by vI the number of NIU (non-impressionable uninformed) individuals who
vote for the incumbent, while vA is the number of NIU individuals who vote for the adversary
(the challenger). Knowledge of the incumbent legislator is limited to the ex-ante distribution
(not reported). These results suggest that, while Stratmann’s explanation for the farming sector contributions is still
valid, we need to explore other models in order to account for these diﬀerent features of the data.
16of the diﬀerence between vA and vI. Uncertainty over the margin of victory of the challenger is













is continuous and diﬀerentiable. In the absence of contributions and voter support by interest
groups39 the incumbent wins the election whenever vA
d − vI
d ≤ 0 40, so the probability of winning
for the incumbent is Fd (0).
Through bargaining with interest groups, the incumbent ensures a certain amount of contribu-
tions and votes by interest group members (the informed voters). Indicate by vI
sd the number of
informed voters in interest group s who vote for the incumbent and by Csd the contributions by























3.2 The political game
We model the interaction between candidates and interest groups as a multiple bilateral bargaining
problem. Each political candidate engages in simultaneous bilateral bargaining with each of the
S special interest groups in her district. The structure of the game is therefore similar to the
one analyzed by Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich (2003). Both papers analyze a game
where one seller simultaneously negotiates with several buyers. This modeling approach oﬀers the
advantage of allowing us to ﬁnd a unique solution in the level of contributions oﬀered by each lobby
provided we make some assumptions about the structure of uncertainty.41
We assume simultaneity in bargaining for two reasons. First, there is no obvious order in which
negotiations should take place since the each candidate could approach any interest group or vice
versa at any point in time. Second, as Raskovich (2003) argues, imposing an order of negotiations
implies that every interest group and candidate can observe whether negotiations of other players
have broken down. Since the negotiations between lobbyists and politicians can simply consist of a
phone call, it seems plausible that they could be resumed at any time and therefore any bargaining
39For simplicity we assume that voters represented by interest groups would cast their vote randomly for the two
candidates in the absence of successful bargaining with the incumbent, so that on average their vote would not have
an impact on the electoral prospect of both candidates.
40A tie is resolved in favor of the incumbent for simplicity
41The politican economy literature has recently employed other modeling devices such as common agency (Gross-
man and Helpman (1994)). These models, under the assumption of quasi-linear preferences, lead to a unique equi-
librium policy, but to a multiplicity of equilibrium contributions. Another interesting example of bilateral barganing
between lobbies and politicians is Drazen and Limâo (2007).
17could not be considered terminated by other lobbies at any point in time.
As a result of the structure imposed, all the lobbies and the legislator can contract upon is the
favorable vote by the legislator, not the ﬁnal outcome of the legislature vote, since the politician
can only decide on his own vote. Let us indicate the action of legislator d to support policy ys
by ads: if the politician supports the policy then asd =1and asd =0otherwise. For simplicity
supporting each policy ys entails no cost for the politician4243.
The game is played in two stages:
1. In the ﬁrst stage the incumbent legislator d enters into simultaneous negotiations with each
lobby s separately. Bargaining between the incumbent and each lobby s determines the
amount of votes promised vI
sd ≤ vsd, the amount of contributions Csd and the position of the
candidate, asd. We assume that the order in which negotiations are made and whether they
succeed or not is not observable by other lobbies until the second stage.
2. In the second stage the legislature votes on the set of proposed policies y, the contributions
obtained by each candidate are spent in an electoral campaign to sway the IU voters and the
election takes place.
We assume that the outcome of the negotiations between lobby s and the incumbent is given





jd. The reaction function of each lobby in terms of other lobbies’ votes
and contributions and the decision by the politician to support the policy, asd, are determined by
42Introducing a cost of supporting policies would entail no diﬀerence in the results of this analysis, unless two
speciﬁc cases are introduced. First, if the marginal cost of supporting a policy increases with the number of “favors”
then a politician will not decide to support every policy. Second, in the case the total amount of resources (e.g. eﬀort)
a politician can devote to supporting policies is limited, the legislator will again decide not to support every piece
of legislation. Both cases would introduce competition among lobbies. Since it is noti m m e d i a t et ou st h ee x t e n t
to which these eﬀects would interact with the mechanisms we intend to illustrate in this paper, we abstract from
competition among lobbies.
43The main reason for excluding competition between special interests is data-driven. We tested extensively for
competition eﬀects by looking at obvious competititors such as upstream and downstream producers employing input-
output tables. We could not ﬁnd any empirical regularity of sort. We believe that, although competition between
special interests is relevant for speciﬁc bills and earmarks, it is unlikely to have such a systematic component across
all districts and special interests (so various ranging from tobacco to steel to hospitals) to be picked up precisely in
our empirical design.























sd ≤ vsd and 0 ≤ Csd ≤ γd + ρdvsd + εsd
Assumption 1 We assume that fd (·) is decreasing.44
Under Assumption1 (2) is a concave problem and therefore delivers a unique choice of Csd for
a given behavior of other lobbies.






vector of contributions (C∗
sd) and a vector of legislator positions (a∗
sd) that satisfy (2) for politician
d and each interest group s =1 ,...,S.
Two simple predictions of this framework are stated in the following lemmas.




Lemma 3 In equilibrium the politician supports each piece of legislation ys.
Proof. The absence of costs of supporting policy ys guarantees the politician always chooses to
support the policy.
W es e et h e s et w ol e m m a sa sr e l a t i v ely unrealistic but useful simpliﬁcations. Given the robustness
checks of Appendix Tables A1 and A2, we know that relaxing them produces minimal consequences
for estimation purposes (the main goal of the model). At the same time these lemmas allow us to
focus on the ﬁrst-order theoretical mechanism.
Consider for now the case of an interior solution to problem (2) in terms of Csd. Such solution




ρdvsd + γd + εsd −
Substitution Eﬀect z }| {
Fd (αdCsd + vsd + V−sd) − Fd (V−sd)




44This assumption is needed to guarantee the concavity of the maximization problem, but for the main result to
hold we just need fd (·) to be decreasing over its positive support.
19Everything else equal, the size of lobby s aﬀects the amount of its contributions through three
eﬀects:
1. Surplus Eﬀect:al a r g e rvsd means that the interest group beneﬁts more from legislation ys.
This eﬀect tends to increase contributions as the increased surplus is shared between the
legislator and the interest group. This eﬀect is constant because of the linearity assumption
in the beneﬁt function.
2. Substitution Eﬀect: as an interest group promises more votes, the amount of contributions
needed to transfer a given surplus share to the legislator declines. This eﬀect declines with vsd
due to the assumption of a decreasing fd (·):a ni n c r e a s ei nvsd yields progressively a smaller
increase in the probability of winning. Therefore, this eﬀect causes contributions to decline
with vsd , but at a declining rate.
3. Marginal Impact Eﬀect: as the number of votes promised increases, the marginal value of
contributions declines because of the assumption of a decreasing fd (·). If an interest group
promises a large number of votes, then it resolves most of the uncertainty. Extremely fa-
vorable events are less and less likely to happen. Therefore the marginal impact of a dollar
of contributions is evaluated at a point where fd (·) is low. Due to this eﬀect contributions
decrease with the size of the lobby45. The strength of this eﬀect hinges on the degree at which
fd (·) declines.
The eﬀects described above are implied by a comparative statics exercise that takes V−sd as
given. Therefore the discussion has ignored the impact that size has on contributions through
the optimal response of other lobbies. This is because under a general distribution function it is
diﬃcult to determine the direction of such eﬀects.46 The non-monotonicity of the FOC (4) creates
the possibility of multiple equilibria in contribution levels C∗
d =( C∗
1d,...,C∗
Sd),w h i c hm a k e si t
impossible to investigate the behavior of contributions unless we make further assumptions about
the density function of the challenger margin. To close the model parametrically we consider
the case in which the margin vA
d − vI
d follows an exponential distribution. The assumption of an
exponential distribution for the challenger margin greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, as the optimal
45The eﬀect can be interpreted as a microfoundation for the reduced-form assumption of decreasing returns to
political contributions. See Drazen and Limâo (2007).
46Reaction functions are generally non-linear.
20amount of contributions is independent of the choice by other lobbies47. T h i si sc r u c i a li no r d e r
to deliver uniqueness of the equilibrium contributions, without which it would not be possible to
proceed to structural analysis.
Assumption 2 The margin of victory vA
d − vI


















In order to guarantee that contributions are positive when γd =0and εsd =0we also make the
following assumption about ρd and αd.
Assumption 3 By assumption: ρd > 1
αd.
We will verify later that estimates of ρd and αd conﬁrm that the assumption is satisﬁed in the
data.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 2,f o re a c hvsd, the equilibrium amount of contributions is
unique and is determined by the following expression:
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Proposition 5 For given εsd, the equilibrium amount of contributions by lobby s,the relationship
between C∗
sd and vsd follows an inverted-U pattern: it increases with vsd for vsd ≤ b vsd and it
decreases with vsd for vsd > b vsd where b vsd is the maximum of the implicit function C∗
sd (vsd) in (5).
Proof. See Appendix.
The exponential distribution presents some properties that are desirable in the context of our
model. First, the pdf is always decreasing48, as required in order to obtain a concave maximization
problem. Second, it is decreasing at a rate such that the combination of the Marginal Beneﬁt
47The intuition behind this assumption relies on the property of negative exponentials that "the future is indepen-
dent of the past" (i.e. they are memoryless). Notice that this assumption is similar in spirit to the assumption of
no economic interaction among lobbies made in several papers in the political bargaining literature, see Drazen and
Limâo (2007).
48This property also implies that, if the location parameter λ is negative, then for the incumbent victory by a




d = λ, but larger margins have
zero probability. We recognize this might not be a fully realistic representation of the ex-ante form of uncertainty.
21Eﬀect and the Substitution Eﬀect dominate over the Surplus eﬀect for large values of vsd,w h i c hi s
consistent with the empirical regularity found in the data in Section 2. Third, the exponential is
parametrically parsimonious, in that it is identiﬁed by just two parameters. This is an important
technical condition that we need to keep in mind when bringing the model to the data.
Since we cannot solve explicitly for C∗
sd we show the inverted-U shape by means of a numerical
example. Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the contribution function for the indicated values of
the parameters.
Given the simple structure of C∗
sd it is possible to assess the eﬀect of changes in the parameters
(β, α, γ, ρ) on the shape of the inverted-U relation. Such eﬀects are described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 Setting for simplicity εsd =0
(i) the maximum amount of contributions in district d is given by the interest group of size:
vmax
sd =
βd (lnαdρd + αdρd − 1) − αdγd
1+αdρd
(7)
and the level of contributions by that group is:
Cmax
sd =
αdγd + βd (1 − αdρd + αdρd lnαdρd)
αd (1 + αdρd)
(8)
(ii) as uncertainty of the electoral race increases, i.e. βd increases, vmax
sd increases and Cmax
sd
increases under the condition that lnαdρd > 1
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition for this result relies on the fact that when elections are more uncertain the marginal
beneﬁt of contributions does not decline as rapidly so the surplus eﬀect dominates for a larger range
of values of vsd, which makes the ‘hump’ shift to the right. In this section we have presented a
model of the interaction between a legislator and several lobbies that, under some assumptions,
delivers the observed inverted-U relationship between votes and contributions49.
In Section 4 we estimate the structural parameters of the model: the electoral impact of a
dollar, αd, the uncertainty of the race, βd and the eﬀectiveness of the politician ρd.
49Although this framework provides a possible explanation for the observed hump-shaped pattern, an alternative
explanation could be developed along the following lines. Imagine that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), politician
d cares about contributions, but also about the welfare of its constituents (in this case all voters in district d). The
proposed policy ys causes an overall distortion in welfare, but also beneﬁts the group of voters vsd. In this case
contributions might increase with the size of the group for t h es a m er e a s o na si no u rm o d e l( t h ep o l i t i c i a no b t a i n sa
fraction of a larger surplus), but might decrease because the welfare loss caused by a given policy ys in the district
decreases with the size of the group vsd. For simplicity, let the welfare loss at the national level be constant. Then
224 Estimation
This section presents a Maximum Likelihood estimator of the structural parameters of the model.
In order to implement ML we impose the distributional assumption that εsd be i.i.d. within district
d and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
d. We account for the censored nature
of political contributions50 (which cannot be negative) through specifying a latent contribution
equation:


















0 if b Csd ≤ 0
b Csd if b Csd > 0
.
With the substantial exception of the nonlinear nature of the model, the problem is a common
censoring framework, that is nicely accommodated by MLE. Notice that while εsd is normally

































































a district with a larger fraction of voters in sector s experiences a relatively lower welfare loss and therefore the
politician d might ask for a lower level of contributions to partially compensate for the welfare loss. In order for these
forces to yield an hump-shaped pattern of contributions, this second eﬀect must get stronger as the voter groups
size vsd increases, i.e. the beneﬁt from policy ys must be increasing more than linearly with group size vsd.I t i s
not obvious on which grounds to justify such a functional form assumption and our explanation, which relies on
a decreasing probability of larger defeat margins (i.e. a declining f (·)) might be easier to rationalize. To se why,
consider that a functional form assumption on diminishing welfare losses would be required to operate similarly for
sectors completely diﬀerent in terms of technology or market characteristics.
We discuss and test in Appendix B a series competing hypothesis.
50Notice that ML approach allows to incorporate this feature of the data in a natural way. In the reduced-form
analysis of the previous section we have opted for OLS as a simpler (and rougher) approximation.
23where we employ the indicator function Zsd = I [Csd =0 ]and denote by θd the vector of parameters
of interest to be estimated for each district d:
θd =( αd,βd,γd,ρ d,σd).
The argument of the logarithm in the ﬁrst element of (9) is the Jacobian of the transformation51.
F i n a l l y ,i nt h ee s t i m a t i o np r o c e d u r ew ew i l li m p o s ec ertain inequality constraints requested by the
model (αd > 0,β d > 0,σd > 0).
In the next sections we ﬁrst report the quantitative results obtained from estimating the bar-
gaining model. We then provide an interpretation of the structural parameters and we compare
them to previous politico-economic studies.
4.1 Results
This section presents the ML estimates of θd district by district, in a fashion similar to the analysis
in (1). Given the reassuring consistency of the reduced-form analysis across Congressional branches
and years, in the structural analysis we will focus on the set of incumbents of the 106th House,
speciﬁcally those running for reelection in November 2000.
From a computational standpoint, the main issues in maximizing (9) involve the ratios of the
αd and βd parameters, the highly nonlinear (exponential) components in the Jacobian, and the
numerical computation of the integral in the last line of (9). The likelihood function turns out
to be relatively well behaved after opportune reparameterization. We conﬁrm this through model-
speciﬁc Monte-Carlo simulations. Speciﬁcally, when performing simulations of the data from known
distributions and parameters, the maximum likelihood estimator of the model performs well in
delivering back the original parameters, even in samples of size 100 (the eﬀective per-district sample
sizes are 86 and 84 for 2000 and 1990 respectively). However, according to the Monte-Carlo evidence
the parameters αd and, especially, βd exhibit a certain degree of sensitivity to miss-speciﬁcations
in the underlying distribution52. Finally, in the following analysis the maximization proceeds from
a set of initial values that is randomly sampled 1,200 times, reassuring on the presence of a unique
maximum.
Table 5 presents the distribution of the maximum likelihood parameters by Congressional dis-
trict race. Since the nonlinear model is unit-dependent, we perform the analysis employing con-
tributions in dollars for Csd and number of employees, vsd, adjusted for average voter turnout of
51That is
¯ ¯ ¯∂εsd/∂ b Csd
¯ ¯ ¯.
52See the rest of this section for further discussion of this issue.
24voting age population in the 2000 electoral cycle, 51.3% (FEC)53. For the sake of exposition and for
consistency with much of the literature we report the inverse of the parameter αd, whose natural
interpretation is the amount of money necessary to buy one vote. This approach has the additional
implication of allowing us to employ $1 as the unit of analysis for all parameters with the exception
of βd (expressed in number of votes). A relatively coarse54 grid-search has to be applied to the
transformed parameter 1/αd. For completeness we also include in the bottom part of Table 5 the
distribution of the maximum likelihood parameters by Congressional district race including the
districts where we obtain a maximum on the bounds of the grid of 1/αd (i.e. at $0 and $1,000).
These ﬁgures are less informative within the framework of our model, since it is problematic to
interpret the results on the bounds (at $0 the value of αd is not ﬁnite and at $1,000 the maximum
of the likelihood function might not have been achieved). The upper part of Table 5 excludes these
districts.
Overall both the SIG’s and the politician’s parameters are precisely estimated when looking
at the frequency of the z-test rejections at 0.05 conﬁdence level (computed with robust standard
errors) across races. Only the parameter γd is statistically zero in less than 1/3 of the districts,
indicating that policy beneﬁts seem to be related to SIG’s size without any constant beneﬁt. The
SIG’s policy beneﬁt per worker ρd is on average $347.9, and its median is $113.2. Notice however
the substantial variation in the estimates of the per-worker beneﬁt. The standard deviation across
Congressional races is $342.66. We observe higher ﬁgures for ρd when focusing on the districts where
the maximum likelihood estimates are not necessarily interior to the bounds of the grid for 1/αd.
Particularly, the mean beneﬁt per worker increases to around $547.9 and the median to $703.8.T h e
standard deviation of the distribution of the idiosyncratic random component εsd,r e p r e s e n t i n gt h e
speciﬁc ability of a politician to support a particular sector, is precisely estimated. The mean value
of σd is $22,223.6 with a standard deviation across all districts of $11,799.9. Including districts on
the bounds of 1/αd does not substantially aﬀect the moments of the estimates of σd.
Focusing on the politician’s parameters, the estimated monetary value of a vote, 1/αd,i so n
average $339.33 with a median55 of $100. Similarly to the case of ρd, the variation across district is
substantial, with a standard deviation of $341. When focusing on the districts where the maximum
is not necessarily interior to the bounds of 1/αd (where the model does not perform accurately) we
53Given the nonlinearity of the model, the use of the appropriate unit for votes and contributions is necessary in
order to obtain consistent estimates of the marginal eﬀect of contributions. In the linear regression models of the
reduced-form section the estimates of the peak are independent of the unit.
54The grid search ranges on 1/αd ∈ {0, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000}.
55The median value of 1/αd falls on a point of the grid.of as a result of its discreteness.
25ﬁnd both higher mean and median ($536.8 and $700 respectively). Notice that 67 percent of the
sample falls within the bounds and only 8 observations out of 401 actually reach a maximum of
the likelihood at 1/αd =0 .
The scale parameter of the ex ante distribution of adversary versus favorable voters to the
incumbent, βd,i ss i g n i ﬁcantly estimated in more than half the districts/races. The location para-
meter of the distribution, λd,i sn o ti d e n t i ﬁed in the model and not estimated. The mean number
of votes of the scale parameter is 334,503.4, and 369,048.3 when we include districts with estimates
on the boundary of the grid of 1/αd. More interestingly, the median number of votes of the scale
parameter is 121,918.2, and 250,189.0 when we include districts with estimates on the boundary of
the grid of 1/αd. To interpret the estimates recall that the mean and median of the distribution are
not identiﬁed without λd, but that the scale of an exponential distribution is its standard deviation
and, more informatively for an asymmetric distribution, approximates the size of the interquartile
range (i.e.βd ' βd (ln4 − ln4/3)). Therefore we can attribute to βd’s estimates the interpretation
of ex ante electoral uncertainty. It is interesting to notice that the results obtained from estimating
ex ante electoral uncertainty from the money-votes curve compare in magnitude to the ex post
electoral margins observed in the data. In the 2000 electoral cycle the average vote margin was
87,168 votes, with an aggregate standard deviation of 45,996 votes. These ﬁgures conﬁrm that βd’s
fall within a reasonable quantitative range, albeit with the caveat of aggregating ex post electoral
uncertainty across Congressional races. Along this line of reasoning in the next section we go in
further depth in analyzing the predictive power of the model by comparing its estimates to data
not explicitly included in the empirical design. We will interpret such results as a validation of the
predictive capacity of the model.
4.2 Validation of the estimates employing information external to the model
The simplicity of the empirical approach that we follow (essentially based on SIG’s voters and
contributions only) should not sacriﬁce excessively to realism of prediction. In this section we
present validation exercises for the estimated parameters of the model. We confront the district-
level estimates of the parameters with out-of-sample information regarding the ex post tightness of
the electoral races and the speciﬁc characteristics of the constituency.
Table 6 reports the results of regressing the district/politician-speciﬁc parameters on a set of
covariates. In columns (1) and (2) the vector of parameters 1/αd, proxying for the estimated cost
of swaying an additional voter, is regressed on the ex post vote margin56 of the electoral race (in
56The ex post vote margin is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the votes accrued to the elected candidate minus
26the ﬁrst column) and on the population density (number of inhabitants per land square mile) in the
second column. In principle we would expect races that are ex ante electorally more uncertain to be
also more expensive. It is however challenging to measure ex ante electoral uncertainty. Poll surveys,
for instance, are extremely volatile and change radically (and endogenously to contributions) over
time. We therefore inversely approximate ex ante uncertainty with the ex post vote margins. On
ad i ﬀerent token, we would expect that more densely populated areas where media markets charge
higher advertisement fees to be also associated with higher 1/αd. In columns (3) the vector of
parameters βd (proxying for ex ante dispersion of electoral margins) is regressed on the ex post
vote margin of the electoral race. Estimated ex ante uncertain races should be negatively associated
with ex post vote margins. We verify that these three hypotheses seem conﬁrmed by the data (in
sign and statistical signiﬁcance for 1/αd a n ds i g no n l yf o rβd ).
A check on the comparative statics of the model is reported in column (4). Proposition 6
predicts a positive correlation between the size of the SIG with largest contributions and the degree
of uncertainty of the race. The intuition is that more uncertain races should present a peak at a
larger lobby size since the marginal impact of a dollar of contributions is relatively more valuable
in tighter races. This is clearly embedded in the estimated parameters (higher βd’s imply larger
ˆ vsd). The data on ex post vote margins conﬁrm this result as well. In column (4) we regress the
reduced-form estimates of ˆ vsd on the size of the vote margin and we ﬁnd the expected negative sign
(statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level). This further supports the interpretation of
column (3) on electoral uncertainty.
Considering that information about the speciﬁc electoral outcomes or geographic characteristics
of the constituency is not directly incorporated in our estimation, we ﬁnd these results reassuring.
4.3 Previous estimates of the cost of an additional vote
Our estimates of 1/α can be compared to the results of previous studies on the impact of campaign
spending on electoral outcomes. In particular these studies have obtained estimates of campaign
spending by the incumbent and the main challenger on the realized vote shares. Levitt (1994)
presents estimates of the eﬀect of a $100,000 (in 1990 dollars) increase in spending on the vote
share. The general conclusion of that study is that campaign spending has no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the election outcome, when one controls for unobserved candidate quality and district
characteristics. At most those eﬀects are very small, implying that votes are very costly to obtain
those accrued to the second, divided by the sum of the two numbers. This measure is inversely proportional to the
tightness of the race.
27though campaign spending. The estimates vary according to the speciﬁcation, but we consider the
numbers reported in column (1) of Table 5 of Levitt (1994) as an example.57 Levitt ﬁnds that
an increase of $100,000 gives the challenger 0.3% m o r eo ft h ev o t e ,w h i l ei tg i v e st h ei n c u m b e n t
only roughly an extra 0.1% of the vote. In 2000 the number of U.S. citizens who had the right
to vote was about 186 millions, of whom 59.5% voted.58 A typical district would have therefore
about 427,600 eligible voters, of whom only 256,500 vote on average. This means that $100,000
would buy about 770 extra votes using the challenger estimate, which amounts to a price of about
$130 per vote. The price would be $390 per vote using the incumbent estimate for the spending
coeﬃcient. These numbers are compatible with the estimates that we report for the 1/αd in our
model. The implied cost of a vote is on average $339.3 with a median of $100 a c c o r d i n gt oo u r
estimates.
Levitt (1994) also reports estimates by Jacobson (1980) and Green and Krasno (1988) of the
same eﬀect but employing diﬀerent empirical designs. In these studies the eﬀects are larger59:t h e
2SLS estimates of Green and Krasno (1988)60 imply an eﬀect of 2.4% (for the challenger) and 2.2%
(for the incumbent), which imply a cost of $16.25 and $18 per vote.
It is worth emphasizing that the estimate of 1/αd that we obtain reﬂects the ex-ante evaluation
by a politician of the cost of buying an extra certain vote. In the studies mentioned above, the
estimates refer to the ex-post realization of the eﬀect of votes on contributions. With this distinction
in mind, our estimates are more in line with the cost implied by Levitt (1994) results.
4.4 Estimating returns to political contributions: Tullock’s puzzle
In this section we present a calibration of the model’s results aiming at quantitatively addressing
what in the political economy literature is commonly referred to as the Tullock’s puzzle61.S i m p l y
stated, the puzzle is that the amount of political contributions is too low relative to the substantial
amount of public resources that special interests seem able to obtain through bargaining with politi-
57The individual coeﬃcients in this column are not individually statistically signiﬁcant, but we use the estimate to
illustrate the order of magnitude.
58See Jamieson et al. (2002). This is the ratio between the number of voters and the the number of citizens who
have the right to vote aged 18 and over. Notice that this is diﬀerent from the ratio between the number of voters and
the number of individuals in the country aged 18 and over (51.3%) due to the presence of foreigners and individuals
who cannot vote. We use the latter percentage when assessing the percentage of voting workers in each sector.
59See Table 3 in Levitt (1994).
60These are the estimates that most closely compare to Levitt (1994) as they include an index of quality of the
challenger.
61In Tullock (1972). See Ansolabehere, et al. (2003) for a detailed overview of the topic.
28cians. This implies absurdly high rates of return from political investments that seem unjustiﬁable
in any other competitive market. Alternatively the puzzle can be restated as the politicians being
unreasonably cheap.
A natural interpretation of our model is that politicians and special interest groups exchange
more than political contributions, they also bargain over votes. The “missing money” may be due
to the omission from the rate of return calculation of the votes that the lobby supplies the politician
at the moment of the election. In order to (roughly) gauge quantitatively the magnitude of such an
omission consider the following example (one of the most striking they present) from Ansolabehere,
de Figueiredo, Snyder (2003, p. 111). In 2000 total USDA subsidies to agriculture amounted
to $22.1 billion62 vis-a-vis total political contributions in the amount of $3.3 million. Taken at
face value these two numbers imply an astronomical rate of return. About $6,665 for every $1 of
political contributions. However, this computation disregards the value of the about 2 million U.S.
working-age voting farmers and the implied value of one of their votes ($400). Consider now the
rate of return that correcting for this additional component would imply. The rate of return adjusts
to a still very high, but more reasonable ﬁgure, about $26 for every $1 of political contributions
($12 for an average year)63. This correction produces a reduction of the estimate of more than
2 orders of magnitude, indicating that accounting for the substitution between contributions and
votes may substantially help in reducing the apparent paradox behind Tullock’s puzzle.
The structural estimates of the model can also help shedding light on the quantitative rele-
vance of the votes/money interaction and their eﬀect on the estimates of the return to “political
investment”. In Table 7 we report the estimated average rates of return for political contributions
across SIGs (106th House) computed in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst line of the table computes the






The average rate of return across all districts and lobbies is $431 for every $1 of political contri-
butions with a large standard deviation across districts of $1542. The mean value is surprisingly
close to estimates obtained using actual subsidy data. We can now compare the average RR to the
62This amount is the highest ﬁgure of the all 1995-2004 decade of subsidies paid by the USDA. The average yearly
ﬁgure ranges around $11 billion.
63Notice that although votes do not ‘cost’ anything to farming interest groups, it is nevertheless necessary to include
them in the calculations to ﬁnd the correct marginal return to contributions, that is the return the next dollar of
contributions would earn the interest group.






The results employing (11) appear on the second and third rows of Table 7. The model-implied
average rate of return RR0 across all districts and all lobbies is a reasonable $0.33 for every $1
of political contributions64 ($0.12 employing the same sample as row 1). The standard deviation
across districts reads around $12,al a r g e rﬁgure which may well encompass cases like the agricultural
e x a m p l ew eh a v ej u s tp r e s e n t e d .
Table 8 reports all the moments of the lobby-speciﬁc estimated rates of return. Part (a) of the
table reports the statistics computed with the deﬁnition in (10), while part (b) of Table 8 employs
the deﬁnition in (11) for estimating returns. As expected, part (b) reports values of the rates of
return that are quantitatively reasonable.
In synthesis we believe the inclusion of the electoral dimension to the bargaining problem over
political contributions sheds substantial light on the rationale behind the observed ﬁgures. The
level of political contributions in the data does not appear unreasonably low once the role of SIG’s
votes is also taken into account.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper models and empirically tests a series of predictions concerning the bargaining of politi-
cians and local special interest groups. We uncover a novel pattern in the data concerning the
relationship between votes and money in US congressional politics that follows an inverted-U re-
lationship. A simultaneous bilateral bargaining game with heterogenous special interest groups
rationalizes the data appropriately65, emphasizing the pattern of substitution between votes and
money that emerges when lobbies tend to be large in terms of workers/voters. The estimates also
provide a valid alternative to present studies of the amount of money necessary to sway one voter
and of the rates of return of political contributions.
An avenue of future research is to explore how the approach developed in this paper may be
extended to formal treatment of the coordination of local and national special interests. While the
pattern of contribution operates mostly at the level of local interactions, national coordination of
64We restrict our attention to the sample with positive political beneﬁt, as required by the model. About 5 percent
of the observations violate this constraint. However including such observations would have the eﬀect of reducing the
rate of return of political contributions even more, not increasing it.
65In Appendix B we explore alternative hypotheses that might be consistent with the pattern observed and show
evidence that points toward an interpretation of the results that is closer to our model.
30SIG’s is essential. Relatively few studies in political science and in political economy have tried to
address this issue systematically, mostly focusing on the SIG as a national entity.
This paper contributes to the literature concerned with modeling the interaction between eco-
nomic and political interests from a rational choice perspective66. Relative to standard reduced-form
approaches in the literature the more structured approach followed in the paper allows to simul-
taneously gauge the role of electoral uncertainty and politicians eﬀectiveness as perceived by the
interest groups.
66The paper therefore is also related to a well established literature on how economic interests inﬂuence political
policy-making. See Peltzman (1984, 1985).
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346A p p e n d i x A
To simplify expressions we are going to drop the subscript d in the following proofs.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Substituting the expression for the probability density function and the cumulative density













We can rewrite this equation as g(Cs)=0 . Function g(·) is continuous and diﬀerentiable on R.
Since limCs→−∞ = −∞ and limCs→∞ = ∞ then by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists
ar e a ln u m b e rC∗
s, such that g (C∗
s)=0















=0 . Then by the Mean Value Theorem,























> 0 so, by contradiction there must be only one real number
that solves g(Cs)=0 . If such solution is negative then contributions are set to be equal to zero.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
We are interested in the behavior of the function C∗




































The slope of the contribution function is positive whenever C∗
s >ρ v s + γ + εs +
β
α − ρβ, it is zero
when
C∗




and it is negative otherwise.
It must be the case that contributions are not larger than total income of the lobby. In Figure
A1 this means that the contribution function must be always below the line C∗
s = ρvs + γ + εs.
35At vs =0contributions C∗











= γ + εs +
β
α
We need to show that C∗
s (0) >γ+ εs. Figure A2 shows that in order to prove this, we need to









at γ + εs and show that it is larger than γ + εs +
β
α:












Inequality (14) is satisﬁed for εs > −γ, a condition that we assume holds (this means εs is not
“too” negative). Since we have established that under certain conditions at vs =0contributions
are strictly smaller than income, we only need to show that the contribution function increases at
a lower rate than income to complete the proof that the contribution function is in between the


















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
From the proof of Proposition 4 we know that the point (vmax
s ,Cmax
s ) is located at the intersec-
tion of the function describing the FOC in (5) and (13). By solving the system of two equations






lnαρ + αρ − 1
1+αρ
which is positive by Assumption 3. We do the same for contributions:
Cmax
sd =
1 − αρ + αρlnαρ
α(1 + αρ)
which is positive if and only if lnαρ > 1.
7 Appendix B: Alternative Hypotheses
The analysis so far has only brieﬂy considered alternative explanations that might be consistent
with the pattern that we uncover in the data. Here we decide to discuss two interesting hypotheses
that could potentially explain the hump-shaped relationship between votes and contributions. We
ﬁnd evidence that points against these explanations and leaves the hypothesis proposed in this
paper as the more convincing alternative.
36A ﬁrst hypothesis, which we refer to as “free-riding”, ﬁnds an explanation for the declining
section of the relationship in the following observation, by Mancur Olson (1965) about larger
groups: “Though all of the members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining
this collective beneﬁt, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective
good.” Free riding would imply that as the size of the group increases, the incentive to contribute
declines. Although we cannot formally test our model against this alternative we attempt to address
this issue in two ways.
First, we employ data on number of establishments per sector in a district to control for the
extent of free-riding. If the Olsonian view were correct, then for a given number of employees in
a sector, we should observe that the smaller the number of ﬁrms (approximated by the number of
establishments), the larger each ﬁrm and the larger the incentive to contribute towards the common
favorable policy. So we should observe a negative relationship between the amount of contributions
and the number of ﬁrms/establishments, given the size of the sector (i.e. size of the labor force).
Denote number of establishments in sector s in district d by esd. The district-level regression results
reported in Table A3 refer to the following speciﬁcation:
Csd = κd + δd,1vsd + δd,2v2
sd + ξdesd + µsd
We ﬁnd that in many districts, contrary to the free-riding hypothesis, for a given sector size,
the amount of political contributions rises the more dispersed the sector is, that is the larger the
number of establishments. In 403 districts out of 435 the coeﬃcient ξd on establishment number is
positive and in 105 also signiﬁcant, pointing to the fact that this data does not seem to indicate the
presence of free-riding and that, even controlling for this dimension, the district-level hump shape,
documented in Table 3 remains unchanged.
The second piece of evidence suggesting that free-riding cannot explain certain features of the
data is found in Table 5 where we show that the hump moves to the right when election margins
are closer (i.e. less predictable). There is no unambiguous reason for why free-riding should
decrease when elections are more uncertain. This is in contrast with our intuitive interpretation
that contributions become more important in uncertain elections because their marginal impact
is higher. Although we cannot nest formally the collective action problem within our model, we
believe these two pieces of evidence point against an Olsonian interpretation of the pattern found
in this paper.
A second hypothesis that we consider is summarized by the following simple example. Imagine
a politician cares equally about votes and contributions and bears a cost m when supporting a
policy favorable to interest group s ( i tm i g h tb eb e c a u s eo ft h ew e l f a r el o s so rp r i v a t ee ﬀort in
37arguing in favor of a piece of legislation). Also assume that the interest group s beneﬁts vs from
such legislation and makes a take-or-leave oﬀer in terms of contributions and electoral support (vs)
to the politician to solicit support of the policy. Such simple game yields the simple prediction that





0 if vs ≤ m
m − vs if vs >m
This simple example would imply that contributions are negligible up to a certain size of the
interest group, they then increase discretely and then decline. Such pattern is not conﬁrmed in the
data where we notice that the relationship between votes and contributions is characterized by a
signiﬁcant increasing section and about 1 dollar out of 3 of political contributions within a district
are paid by the SIG’s below the median. This seems to suggest that the hypothesis is not suﬃcient
to explain the hump-shaped pattern.
38TABLE 1
 Definition of Special Interests and number of employees for 106th Congress (House).
OSID Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
6 Forestry & Forest Products  1600.774 1890.797 18.3855 17640.01
7 Agricultural Services & Production 263.0234 418.6269 0 4565.465
8 Oil & Gas  171.6477 424.3744 0 2530.822
9 Mining 806.4858 1501.08 2.622 12571.5
10 Coal Mining  172.6079 852.6048 0 11258.5
11 Electric Utilities  1288.346 842.5555 5.4245 5954.603
12 Natural Gas Pipelines  281.465 305.3758 0 1928.5
13 Construction Services  2988.811 2098.047 125.388 17816.61
14 General Contractors  3790.737 1690.637 954.99 19602.02
15 Building Trade Unions  3790.737 1690.637 954.99 19602.02
16 Home Builders  1834.398 816.7879 373.984 6305.734
17 Special Trade Contractors  6644.215 2653.552 2120.248 20260.6
18 Food Processing & Sales  10205.9 3698.206 3651.561 37717.5
19 Food Products Manufacturing  2306.02 1598.204 193 9917.988
20 Meat processing & products  1227.074 2393.117 0 24158.5
21 Tobacco 76.65347 439.246 0 6232.55
22 Textiles 1388.488 3482.393 41.344 41151.9
23 Clothing Manufacturing  1242.382 1909.777 22.5435 12138.29
24 Printing & Publishing  3673.303 2303.484 356.967 25079.53
25 Chemical & Related Manufacturing 1640.49 1927.645 67.901 19408.71
26 Pharmaceuticals / Health Products 1289.976 1407.634 47.26 10972.17
27 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing  563.7434 1100.758 0 9732.198
28 Building Materials & Equipment  1298.678 1208.794 27.408 8409
30 Steel Production  1098.956 1819.361 0 23669.44
31 Telecom Services & Equipment  638.6521 1180.519 0 15302.03
32 Defense Electronics  1087.843 1572.09 0 11892.87
33 Transportation Unions  11137.59 6338.314 841.752 42422.91
34 Automotive 6194.012 5095.358 359.64 36013.28
35 Auto Manufacturers  3050.275 4982.112 15.01 32731.62
36 Defense Aerospace  1126.361 2995.349 0 40780.5
37 Medical Supplies  726.2326 678.4132 42.282 4182.918
38 Car Dealers  3143.737 868.8899 326.106 5843.848
39 Retail Sales  17256.11 3776.982 5958.36 33773.91
40 Food Stores  6672.805 1573.148 2784.362 13160.99
41 Beer, Wine & Liquor  473.9975 497.6569 88.7165 7296.957
42 Air Transport Unions  1511.263 2724.186 0 26866.83
43 Air Transport  1511.263 2724.186 0 26866.83
45 Sea Transport  116.6885 355.5107 0 4147.58
46 Trucking 3315.628 1817.451 482.112 13248.5
48 Books, Magazines & Newspapers  1771.081 1556.84 169.456 20656.77
49 Computers/Internet 3183.758 4891.093 13.851 51180.5TABLE 1 (cont.)
 Definition of Special Interests and number of employees for 106th Congress (House).
OSID Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
50 Computer Software  773.1745 1457.821 4.617 12025.71
51 TV / Movies / Music  1890.093 1737.901 242.998 20868.35
52 Motion Picture Prod. & Distr. 664.0962 851.4915 91.8855 6584.293
53 TV Production & Distribution  1197.087 1145.744 194.987 9716.751
54 Recorded Music & Music Prod. 70.44736 181.7367 0 2343.38
55 Commercial TV & Radio Stations  622.5587 656.3843 4.617 8808.215
56 Cable & Satellite TV Prod. & Distr. 532.9909 519.0946 10.945 5123.996
57 Telephone Utilities  2762.673 2399.578 476.4955 18075.83
58 Commercial Banks  4493.89 2537.401 775.656 29970.92
59 Finance / Credit Companies  1455.047 1326.288 55.89 8998
60 Securities & Investment  2053.609 5276.703 33.534 72306.61
61 Insurance 5335.83 4047.251 345.303 33270.47
62 Real Estate  3545.89 2262.202 672.6205 22452.7
63 Lawyers / Law Firms  2439.902 2193.965 484.056 27134.4
64 Accountants 2680.414 2628.266 566.321 15356.94
65 Architectural Services  2790.666 2041.217 84.078 17622.39
66 Business Services  4364.555 3071.728 399 20300.56
67 Advertising/Public Relations  1371.45 1853.434 87.237 24603
68 Waste Management  743.6629 368.9448 166.86 4836.013
69 Teachers Unions  1682.749 796.674 258.5 5622.129
70 Education 5920.725 4476.681 616.5 33856.88
71 Health Professionals  7052.444 1734.837 2482.245 13481.56
72 Dentists 1640.643 457.2083 538.974 3101.65
73 Health Services/HMOs  3508.377 1967.299 796.5 19131.1
74 Hospitals & Nursing Homes  17926.79 5090.785 4536.234 43214.27
75 Recreation / Live Entertainment  783.5836 908.7351 80.693 11383.91
76 Pro. Sports, Arenas & Services 255.4357 294.7838 3.57 2950
77 Casinos / Gambling  490.8453 1291.754 0 17499.5
78 Lodging / Tourism  4243.569 8069.158 118.341 118111.2
79 Food & Beverage  18871.83 5041.846 3970.863 41557.07
80 Restaurants & Drinking Estab. 17506.03 4821.89 3545.37 37134
81 Funeral Services  406.5309 148.0021 86.5 965
82 Clergy & Religious Org. 3604.952 1439.032 666.999 13692.06
85 Dairy 329.5306 465.9284 0 3360.06
86 Credit Unions  473.7558 261.2535 9.72 1979.561
87 Chiropractors 245.7761 94.97468 67.592 558.5
88 Alternative Energy Prod. & Serv. 38.96531 104.5054 0 978.723
89 Nutritional & Dietary Suppl. 73.85015 268.7844 0 3755.029
90 Miscellaneous Defense  15.6081 97.49768 0 1749.5
91 Airlines 1306.594 2540.237 0 26371.38
92 Cruise Ships & Lines  29.58883 212.2318 0 2942.45
93 Savings & Loans  589.7094 487.3434 8.8425 2755.505
94 Mortgage Bankers & Brokers  562.6269 526.3119 21.384 3998.392
95 Venture Capital  94.85496 110.2757 2.261 1116
96 Nurses 5818.742 1991.377 2155.5 12931TABLE 2 (House)
Political contributions and employment size of special interest group.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
106th House Dep. var.= Political contributions (thousands $)
Fraction Employed 287.895 14.691 361.462 28.317 1030.464 43.747 681.284 48.805
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -28245.750 1617.395 -11207.240 1590.591
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.032 0.467 0.061 0.469
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.018 0.030
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 2214 668
106th House Dep. var.= Fraction of total contributions (*100)
Fraction Employed 0.481 0.013 0.629 0.038 1.837 0.045 1.234 0.066
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -51.594 1.786 -21.173 2.017
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.037 0.434 0.078 0.437
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.017 0.029
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 2257 806
101st House Dep. var.= Political contributions (thousands $)
Fraction Employed 134.406 8.359 189.868 14.744 500.155 24.004 324.890 26.756
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -16742.460 1009.938 -5707.463 972.730
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.017 0.447 0.037 0.448
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.014 0.028
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 2241 413
101st House Dep. var.= Fraction of total contributions (*100)
Fraction Employed 0.431 0.018 0.631 0.041 1.618 0.057 1.084 0.083
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -54.350 2.675 -19.136 2.969
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.020 0.416 0.045 0.417
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.014 0.028
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 2254 422
Note: The 106th Congress refers to the electoral cycle of year 2000, 101th to 1990. Fraction employed is the total number of 
workers employed in a SIG divided by congressional district's (State's for the Senate) population. Total number of observations 
for 106th House is 37410 (no. House seats 435 * no. SIG 86). Total number of observations for 106th Senate is 8600 (no. 
Senate seats 100 * no. SIG 86). Total number of observations for 101st House is 36540 (no. seats 435 * no. SIG 84). Total 
number of observations for 101st Senate is 8400 (no. seats 100 * no. SIG 84). Standard errors clustered at the electoral district 
level (congressional district for House and State for Senate). All regressions include a constant, not reported.TABLE 2 (Senate)
Political contributions and employment size of special interest group.
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
106th Senate Dep. var.= Political contributions (thousands $)
Fraction Employed 450.076 71.632 987.190 169.554 1877.105 245.403 1893.516 299.606
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -55299.620 7487.957 -35816.140 7070.151
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.014 0.499 0.034 0.502
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.016 0.026
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 506 296
106th Senate Dep. var.= Fraction of total contributions (*100)
Fraction Employed 0.366 0.034 0.969 0.112 1.658 0.109 1.843 0.224
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -50.039 3.698 -34.528 7.195
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.016 0.383 0.043 0.386
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.016 0.026
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 516 288
101st Senate Dep. var.= Political contributions (thousands $)
Fraction Employed 322.960 53.730 760.431 129.252 1351.827 193.209 991.311 207.566
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -55066.850 8176.226 -12454.240 7963.837
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.010 0.496 0.025 0.497
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.012 0.397
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 492 0
101st Senate Dep. var.= Fraction of total contributions (*100)
Fraction Employed 0.436 0.052 1.264 0.173 2.061 0.128 1.960 0.277
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -86.938 6.431 -37.550 9.695
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.010 0.411 0.032 0.412
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.011 0.260
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 522 0
Note: The 106th Congress refers to the electoral cycle of year 2000, 101th to 1990. Fraction employed is the total number of 
workers employed in a SIG divided by congressional district's (State's for the Senate) population. Total number of observations 
for 106th House is 37410 (no. House seats 435 * no. SIG 86). Total number of observations for 106th Senate is 8600 (no. 
Senate seats 100 * no. SIG 86). Total number of observations for 101st House is 36540 (no. seats 435 * no. SIG 84). Total 
number of observations for 101st Senate is 8400 (no. seats 100 * no. SIG 84). Standard errors clustered at the electoral district 
level (congressional district for House and State for Senate). All regressions include a constant, not reported.TABLE 2 (Senate - Class I and Class II)
Political contributions and employment size of special interest group.
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
106th Senate Class I Dep. var.= Political contributions (thousands $)
Fraction Employed 1086.119 148.988 1771.210 294.353 4037.228 400.327 3637.811 0.464
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -113540.700 11739.630 -70819.900 11187.770
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.044 0.624 0.085 0.628
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.017 0.025
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 142 93
106th Senate Class I Dep. var.= Fraction of total contributions (*100)
Fraction Employed 0.449 0.045 0.965 0.176 1.873 0.151 2.066 0.324
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -54.784 4.968 -39.891 9.508
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.033 0.561 0.076 0.567
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.017 0.025
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 144 99
101st Senate Class II Dep. var.= Political contributions (thousands $)
Fraction Employed 769.101 111.141 1602.916 224.778 3236.441 368.586 2283.231 354.845
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -131506.000 16090.280 -36407.150 17042.020
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.026 0.666 0.068 0.667
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.012 0.313
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 158 0
101st Senate Class II Dep. var.= Fraction of total contributions (*100)
Fraction Employed 0.451 0.047 1.192 0.143 2.137 0.158 1.960 0.301
(Fraction Employed)
2 -- -- -89.865 7.541 -41.105 11.470
District F.E. No Yes No Yes
Lobby F.E. No Yes No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.016 0.662 0.049 0.665
Peak Fraction Employed -- -- 0.011 0.023
# Obs. Above Peak -- -- 166 27
Note: Class I senators were elected in Nov. 2000 (2408 observations) and Class II in Nov. 1990 (2688 observations). TABLE 3 (a)
Political contributions and Special Interest Group employment size: Number of district-specific tests supporting the 
inverse-U hypothesis in reduced form.




Controlling for value 
added of s.
Excluding OSID 39, 74, 
79, 80.
Tests within district d: 106th House 106th House 106th House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 413 out of 435 420 out of 435 363 out of 435
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 251 out of 435 312 out of 435 238 out of 435
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 218 out of 435 251 out of 435 117 out of 435
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 271 out of 435 309 out of 435 157 out of 435
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.018 (0.013) 0.021 (0.055) 0.039 (0.179)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 5.382 (2.169) 5.066 (1.745) 3.702 (4.493)
Tests within district d: 101st House 101st House 101st House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 402 out of 435 401 out of 435 374 out of 435
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 188 out of 435 231 out of 435 179 out of 435
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 161 out of 435 191 out of 435 122 out of 435
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 220 out of 435 235 out of 435 175 out of 435
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.045 (0.601) 0.017 (0.023) 0.018 (0.070)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 6.248 (3.649) 5.431 (2.675) 4.363 (3.440)
Tests within district d: 106th Senate 106th Senate 106th Senate
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 89 out of 100 91 out of 100 89 out of 100
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 53 out of 100 62 out of 100 46 out of 100
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 40 out of 100 46 out of 100 36 out of 100
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 53 out of 100 59 out of 100 44 out of 100
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.016 (.004) 0.017 (0.004) 0.015 (0.017)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 5.741 (1.921) 5.681 (3.428) 5.224 (4.179)
Tests within district d: 101st Senate 101st Senate 101st Senate
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 90 out of 100 90 out of 100 85 out of 100
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 35 out of 100 49 out of 100 34 out of 100
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 30 out of 100 40 out of 100 29 out of 100
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 52 out of 100 53 out of 100 44 out of 100
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.011 (0.003) 0.012 (0.005) 0.010 (0.011)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 6.200 (3.295) 5.177 (2.216) 4.976 (3.387)
Note:  Standard errors robust at the electoral district level (congressional district for House and for Senate). Number of 
SIG for 101st Congress is 84. Number of SIG for 106th Congress is 86. The number of total regressions is equal to the 
number of seats in the House or the Senate. Excluded OSID are: 39 (Retail Sales); 74 (Hospitals and Nursing Homes); 79 
(Food and Beverage); 80 (Restaurants and Drinking Estab.). The numbers in parentheses next to the mean peak of the 
fraction of population employed and the mean number of observations above the peak of the parabola are the 
corresponding std. deviations. TABLE 3 (b)
Political contributions and Special Interest Group employment size: 
Number of SIG-specific tests supporting the inverse-U hypothesis 
in reduced form.




Tests within district d: 106th House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 55 out of 86
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 41 out of 86
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 16 out of 86
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 20 out of 86
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.106* (0.546)*
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 18.636 (49.681)
Tests within district d: 101st House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 59 out of 84
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 38 out of 84
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 23 out of 84
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 26 out of 84
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.021 (0.034)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 25.966 (61.238)
Tests within district d: 106th Senate
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 62 out of 86
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 23 out of 86
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 8 out of 86
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 12 out of 86
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.008 (0.012)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 15.645 (23.632)
Tests within district d: 101st Senate
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 41 out of 84
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 15 out of 84
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 8 out of 84
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 12 out of 84
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.009 (0.011)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 19.951 (25.916)
Note: Robust standard errors at the SIG level. Number of 
observation for each within-SIG regression is 435 for the House 
and 100 for the Senate. The number of total regressions is equal to 
the number of SIGs (86 for 106th Congress and 84 for 101st 
Congress). The numbers in parentheses next to the mean peak of 
the fraction of population employed and the mean number of 
observations above the peak of the parabola are the corresponding 
std. deviations. *Excluding OSID 58 (commercial banks) the mean 
peak fraction employed is 0.033 (0.107).TABLE 4
Special interest groups with largest number of employees do not pay the largest amount of political contributions.
106th House 101st House 106th Senate 101st Senate
Samples: Within each district (Congressional district or State)
Frac. largest 
employer is top payer
0.014 [6 out of 435] 0.016 [7 out of 435] 0.000 [0 out of 100] 0.010 [1 out of 100]
Frac. largest 5 
percentile of 
employers are top 
payers 
0.039 [17 out of 435] 0.039 [17 out of 435] 0.020 [2 out of 100] 0.030 [3 out of 100]
Samples: Within each industry (OSID)
Frac. largest 
employer is top payer
0.000 [0 out of 86] 0.024 [2 out of 84] 0.058 [5 out of 86] 0.071 [6 out of 84]
Frac. largest 5 
percentile of 
employers are top 
payers 
0.372 [32 out of 86] 0.298 [25 out of 84] 0.198 [17 out of 86] 0.179 [15 out of 84]
Note: The within-district analysis is performed in 435 districts for the House and 100 Senate races. The largest and largest 5 
percent of employers in the district are considered. The largest 5 percent of employers' total amounts are averaged and 
compared with the mean total contributions at all 5-centiles. In each district there are either 86 (106th Congress) or 84 
industries (101st). The within-industry analysis is performed in each of the 86 (for 106th Congress) and 84 (for 101st Congress) 
industries. The largest and the largest 5 percent of employers in the industry are considered. For each industry we consider 435 
congressional districts or 100 Senate seats. TABLE 5
Distribution of Maximum Likelihood estimates of structural parameters by Congressional district race.
Parameters Interpretation
106th House








γ Const. pol. benefit to SIG ($) 14.81% -1825.7 -1935.0 6659.5
ρ Per vote policy benefit ($) 48.89% 113.2 347.9 342.6
σ Std. dev. pol. benefit ($) 99.62% 20216.8 22223.6 11799.9
Politician
1/α Value of a vote ($) 48.88% 100.0 339.3 341.0
β Ex ante elect. uncert. (# votes) 49.62% 121918.2 334503.4 534490.4
log Likelihood -632.1 -629.7 119.0
Bounds No. Obs.
1/α = 0 8
1/α = 1000 124
Total 401
SIG Including districts on bounds of 1/α
γ Const. pol. benefit to SIG ($) 20.15% -3215.7 -3069.8 7846.8
ρ Per vote policy benefit ($) 58.96% 703.8 547.9 423.7
σ Std. dev. pol. benefit ($) 99.75% 22724.3 25464.5 13279.4
Politician
1/α Value of a vote ($) 59.20% 700.0 536.8 419.8
β Ex ante elect. uncert. (# votes) 62.69% 250189.0 369048.3 510938.7
log Likelihood -655.1 -650.5 125.2
Note:  Number of SIG for 106th Congress is 86. The number of total regressions is equal to the number of 
seats in the House in which incumbent runs in the November 2000 elections, 401. P-values are constructed 
from z-stats using robust standard errors. The range of the grid search includes values of α between 0 and 
1000.TABLE 6
Validation of estimates of model's parameters by Congressional district race.
106th House
All races by House incumbent on November 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable 1/α 1/α β
Estimated v 
at peak




Constant 608.631 528.830 406102.000 0.021
(41.905) (21.519) (57079.83) (0.02)
Obs. 391 401 383 378
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regression in column (3) 
excludes observations with 1/α = 0. The dependent variable in column (4) is the 
estimated fraction of voters at the peak as estimated in the reduced form of Table 
2. The regression in column (4) constrains the sample to the districts where the 
reduced-form inverse-U relationship holds at least in sign. Reduced-form peak 
and β correlate positively with p = 0.002.TABLE 7
Estimated average rates of return for political contributions across SIG (106th House)
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Obs
Contribution-only average 
rate of return of political 
contributions
 (γd+ρdvsd)/Csd - 1 63.117 431.333 1542.233 38220.180 -0.995 22516
Model's generated average 
rate of return of political 
contributions (Csd > 0)
 (γd+ρdvsd)/(Csd+vsd/αd) - 1 0.005 0.119 1.943 123.994 -0.999 22516
Model's generated average 
rate of return of political 
contributions (whole 
sample)
 (γd+ρdvsd)/(Csd+vsd/αd) - 1 0.005 0.337 12.666 1275.236 -0.999 31002
Notes: Moments of the rates of return distribution are computed across all SIG/districts. Sample includes all observations 
verifying the model's restriction  (γd+ρdvds) > 0, 93.4 percent of the overall sample.TABLE 8 (a)
 Contributions-only estimated rates of return of Special Interests for incumbent races of 106th 
Congress (House).
OSID Definition Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
6 Forestry & Forest Products  69.46621 453.8693 2383.075 36316.64 0.210778
7 Agricultural Services & Production 9.496587 50.99666 156.212 1843.249 -0.96136
8 Oil & Gas  -0.21673 10.73857 79.73958 1221.669 -0.98812
9 Mining 38.40978 199.153 667.3774 8204.909 -0.79511
10 Coal Mining  12.78226 78.28989 239.4523 1636.127 -0.75832
11 Electric Utilities  30.2248 117.45 286.8087 3324.877 -0.9068
12 Natural Gas Pipelines  14.20873 83.91908 192.3033 1557.883 -0.8574
13 Construction Services  168.9036 658.8242 1678.305 16269.25 -0.60993
14 General Contractors  92.90437 597.1642 1663.384 13312.08 -0.79697
15 Building Trade Unions  57.70707 194.1319 649.4268 7826.718 -0.88241
16 Home Builders  80.82034 315.3867 740.2063 7096.734 -0.03668
17 Special Trade Contractors  432.3758 1973.299 4291.23 39354.91 -0.33609
18 Food Processing & Sales  512.0051 1670.271 2915.977 17513.38 1.318849
19 Food Products Manufacturing  262.6566 721.3017 1098.121 7183.199 -0.30274
20 Meat processing & products  118.0243 528.0966 1141.818 7229.768 -0.51141
21 Tobacco -0.15526 20.27398 138.0791 1453.143 -0.98779
22 Textiles 105.449 341.5649 596.4384 3908.865 0.118846
23 Clothing Manufacturing  179.9449 868.8335 1957.984 11296.6 -0.76136
24 Printing & Publishing  341.1616 1234.84 2365.281 17384.74 -0.16561
25 Chemical & Related Manufacturing 73.57719 373.199 971.6295 11805.29 -0.65575
26 Pharmaceuticals / Health Products 42.60455 193.1848 591.4776 8404.143 -0.94573
27 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing  13.49886 92.18169 225.4475 2539.451 -0.9872
28 Building Materials & Equipment  51.22651 192.8596 485.8517 7095.993 -0.06815
30 Steel Production  93.37337 500.0529 1134.437 7492.563 0.47473
31 Telecom Services & Equipment  16.11716 197.6582 720.7256 9125.971 -0.99747
32 Defense Electronics  47.48808 325.4713 840.4836 7584.881 -0.98734
33 Transportation Unions  166.8247 1006.595 4688.982 76990.7 -0.74124
34 Automotive 140.7527 472.9585 1195.004 10206.25 -0.44205
35 Auto Manufacturers  142.4302 551.2143 995.6761 6399.827 -0.67491
36 Defense Aerospace  11.42735 254.0812 1057.238 13048.08 -0.99486
37 Medical Supplies  89.55594 311.3733 577.66 4183.752 -0.87175
38 Car Dealers  133.2182 418.3943 971.7947 9687.272 -0.45888
39 Retail Sales  805.1422 2520.978 4665.285 46538.04 1.11792
40 Food Stores  758.6516 2049.16 3310.386 28956.47 5.602664
41 Beer, Wine & Liquor  13.14069 90.17342 300.5895 3560.262 -0.91008
42 Air Transport Unions  47.75562 427.6841 1293.236 15747.05 -0.81687
43 Air Transport  10.22997 178.082 671.9977 7491.157 -0.95499
45 Sea Transport  8.450643 47.21568 104.906 972.2959 -0.97508
46 Trucking 238.9747 799.1642 1540.206 14230.61 0.516753
48 Books, Magazines & Newspapers  232.7946 757.7194 1328.634 8883.293 -0.68706
49 Computers/Internet 70.15534 316.1216 741.8246 8235.989 -0.64065TABLE 8 (a) (cont.)
 Contributions-only estimated rates of return of Special Interests for incumbent races of 106th 
Congress (House).
OSID Definition Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
50 Computer Software  38.89904 222.041 713.5065 9165.441 -0.82763
51 TV / Movies / Music  80.3492 313.5523 668.0061 6229.084 -0.94661
52 Motion Picture Prod. & Distr. 133.6984 521.3942 1976.397 17241.19 -0.64619
53 TV Production & Distribution  610.3671 1186.362 1634.773 9638.371 0.420149
54 Recorded Music & Music Prod. 14.349 59.50835 159.3225 1352.87 -0.92964
55 Commercial TV & Radio Stations  76.04497 251.2142 451.3586 2646.756 -0.32975
56 Cable & Satellite TV Prod. & Distr. 49.13436 173.2418 317.4409 2908.691 -0.74214
57 Telephone Utilities  73.20511 231.4016 465.9969 4869.236 -0.86981
58 Commercial Banks  82.41708 381.2558 1446.082 23686.1 -0.36678
59 Finance / Credit Companies  97.81245 500.2325 1338.404 14497.59 -0.85493
60 Securities & Investment  23.67031 154.8254 810.0807 14059.45 -0.95324
61 Insurance 70.41142 467.1666 2160.954 33774.64 -0.64271
62 Real Estate  40.57536 98.41199 271.6332 4163.127 -0.84685
63 Lawyers / Law Firms  18.8536 39.66926 56.08577 368.8455 -0.91201
64 Accountants 67.53531 450.77 1303.956 16010.73 -0.94806
65 Architectural Services  556.7852 1385.388 2870.658 35429.96 0.802569
66 Business Services  146.6403 419.0515 1047.078 15776.4 -0.78808
67 Advertising/Public Relations  157.6044 584.105 1192.58 10893.24 -0.81832
68 Waste Management  116.0646 375.1598 638.2673 4277.786 0.550825
69 Teachers Unions  93.6469 194.3956 405.9865 3087.458 -0.80666
70 Education 317.4011 1086.09 2510.305 24294.09 -0.12979
71 Health Professionals  61.59924 159.1317 302.8274 3612.677 -0.76301
72 Dentists 126.0545 300.414 697.0682 8680.082 -0.66499
73 Health Services/HMOs  309.6185 1039.802 3069.483 46195.36 -0.94865
74 Hospitals & Nursing Homes  807.1793 2040.14 3737.314 40830.58 1.32598
75 Recreation / Live Entertainment  148.6769 475.9849 934.5978 7953.858 -0.83767
76 Pro. Sports, Arenas & Services 70.31291 161.1648 246.6464 1243.228 -0.39465
77 Casinos / Gambling  24.99148 129.0252 281.6628 2511.563 -0.97414
78 Lodging / Tourism  370.5891 1427.752 3026.602 20337.62 -0.67287
79 Food & Beverage  852.5618 3888.731 9154.868 81250.91 5.8998
80 Restaurants & Drinking Estab. 1057.463 3733.099 7543.469 61947.9 6.40774
81 Funeral Services  116.99 253.6301 387.0642 2604.662 -0.40937
82 Clergy & Religious Org. 1267.447 3020.99 4087.778 21775.92 2.118608
85 Dairy 21.63052 68.86308 117.7111 779.3773 -0.94286
86 Credit Unions  36.32233 101.4991 201.34 2314.969 -0.63828
87 Chiropractors 90.31703 142.6112 174.6534 1200.412 0.033784
88 Alternative Energy Prod. & Serv. 15.78063 80.3858 190.7887 926.6316 -0.52527
89 Nutritional & Dietary Suppl. 29.24471 90.25188 124.9661 381.242 0.026233
90 Miscellaneous Defense  0.432111 4.110336 10.73269 68.69561 -0.96819
91 Airlines 41.17789 435.1534 1200.766 9800.691 -0.88979
92 Cruise Ships & Lines  4.21104 45.64794 85.6865 376.4198 -0.81159
93 Savings & Loans  67.72684 225.9444 446.2162 4013.262 -0.71818
94 Mortgage Bankers & Brokers  67.91869 246.4069 561.7087 6482.101 -0.72403
95 Venture Capital  10.22499 33.26382 80.29157 714.3822 -0.892
96 Nurses 789.6308 2095.617 4148.486 32928.39 2.079814TABLE 8 (b)
 Model estimated rates of return of Special Interests for incumbent races of 106th Congress 
(House).
OSID Definition Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
6 Forestry & Forest Products  0.000783 0.001179 0.342323 5.903375 -0.92143
7 Agricultural Services & Production -0.08923 -0.12623 0.412095 3.282604 -0.99334
8 Oil & Gas  -0.50251 -0.46178 0.344932 1.622594 -0.99181
9 Mining -0.01042 0.099619 1.645732 26.20708 -0.97703
10 Coal Mining  0.052053 5.580978 26.9863 260.2688 -0.86422
11 Electric Utilities  -0.02369 -0.10387 0.171128 0.373101 -0.93068
12 Natural Gas Pipelines  -0.03685 0.228985 3.597146 62.92948 -0.98393
13 Construction Services  0.006331 0.137617 1.373248 23.33605 -0.60993
14 General Contractors  0.0042 0.037658 0.297339 4.16176 -0.79697
15 Building Trade Unions  0.003632 0.004703 0.157345 1.195145 -0.88241
16 Home Builders  0.000935 0.037917 0.823348 16.18748 -0.73341
17 Special Trade Contractors  0.011523 0.254944 2.263721 37.07743 -0.33609
18 Food Processing & Sales  0.011699 0.241305 1.765248 21.43826 -0.01871
19 Food Products Manufacturing  0.006594 0.123698 1.181093 21.37253 -0.68408
20 Meat processing & products  0.003537 0.225605 2.087895 32.15586 -0.84829
21 Tobacco -0.28614 7.949999 86.4309 1021.937 -0.98779
22 Textiles -0.0001 0.105736 0.956037 13.56907 -0.95062
23 Clothing Manufacturing  0.004343 0.094038 0.801144 8.633419 -0.93199
24 Printing & Publishing  0.009326 0.141638 0.993152 14.07649 -0.16561
25 Chemical & Related Manufacturing -0.00169 -0.00866 0.260895 4.02383 -0.81055
26 Pharmaceuticals / Health Products -0.01553 -0.06543 0.332393 5.157692 -0.94573
27 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing  -0.05805 -0.09106 0.924078 15.29241 -0.99459
28 Building Materials & Equipment  -0.00512 -0.00799 0.26435 2.956425 -0.87546
30 Steel Production  0.000323 0.2315 2.954573 53.07651 -0.98768
31 Telecom Services & Equipment  -0.0254 -0.06578 0.379865 2.40166 -0.99862
32 Defense Electronics  -0.00269 0.199681 3.043492 57.3824 -0.99498
33 Transportation Unions  0.008895 0.079814 0.675873 9.637922 -0.81682
34 Automotive 0.005951 0.049336 0.456579 8.528609 -0.44205
35 Auto Manufacturers  0.005694 0.072626 0.811028 11.75462 -0.97395
36 Defense Aerospace  -0.02719 0.009899 1.142638 12.58425 -0.99489
37 Medical Supplies  -0.00135 0.122243 1.737848 32.83991 -0.98513
38 Car Dealers  0.004915 0.233525 3.564881 69.98215 -0.45888
39 Retail Sales  0.013228 0.221981 1.588019 25.28973 0.001675
40 Food Stores  0.012679 0.239249 1.87505 26.66551 -0.03513
41 Beer, Wine & Liquor  -0.05913 -0.14104 0.249383 1.232289 -0.92819
42 Air Transport Unions  0.002764 0.435672 4.213728 73.7752 -0.99346
43 Air Transport  -0.0677 -0.19024 0.375316 4.12642 -0.99346
45 Sea Transport  -0.05649 1.079242 5.390622 62.92948 -0.99172
46 Trucking 0.008952 0.093066 0.73325 12.27187 -0.72668
48 Books, Magazines & Newspapers  0.005716 0.339868 4.098285 70.54661 -0.68706
49 Computers/Internet 0.00226 -0.01447 0.153995 1.149622 -0.6706TABLE 8 (b) (cont.)
 Model estimated rates of return of Special Interests for incumbent races of 106th Congress 
(House).
OSID Definition Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
50 Computer Software  -0.00583 0.03086 0.558439 6.437755 -0.9503
51 TV / Movies / Music  -0.00058 0.012657 0.597521 11.33115 -0.94661
52 Motion Picture Prod. & Distr. -0.00323 0.051488 0.482558 6.495958 -0.99125
53 TV Production & Distribution  0.006142 0.092904 0.815439 13.32496 -0.84709
54 Recorded Music & Music Prod. -0.05839 1.285114 5.26448 46.78766 -0.97887
55 Commercial TV & Radio Stations  -0.0058 0.056157 0.799273 11.16988 -0.97515
56 Cable & Satellite TV Prod. & Distr. -0.01331 0.01207 0.899595 16.01649 -0.97528
57 Telephone Utilities  -0.00083 -0.03067 0.137429 1.243481 -0.86981
58 Commercial Banks  0.002677 0.001151 0.092676 1.119453 -0.41331
59 Finance / Credit Companies  0.003188 0.026501 0.331694 5.394055 -0.86577
60 Securities & Investment  -0.02326 -0.10539 0.196043 0.680236 -0.95324
61 Insurance 0.002155 -0.01532 0.098983 0.693106 -0.64271
62 Real Estate  -0.00946 -0.06006 0.123471 0.105636 -0.84685
63 Lawyers / Law Firms  -0.03418 -0.12447 0.185367 0.134634 -0.91201
64 Accountants -9.9E-05 -0.01564 0.193899 2.928047 -0.94806
65 Architectural Services  0.010207 0.172632 1.366102 22.61286 -0.40136
66 Business Services  0.005684 0.018978 0.128005 1.23553 -0.78808
67 Advertising/Public Relations  0.003705 0.101549 0.847323 14.32794 -0.95756
68 Waste Management  0.000877 0.067974 0.85569 16.21008 -0.87628
69 Teachers Unions  0.002484 0.019014 0.177652 1.914057 -0.80666
70 Education 0.010899 0.153151 1.205444 20.17204 -0.22696
71 Health Professionals  0.002254 -0.002 0.091657 0.49664 -0.76301
72 Dentists 0.0021 0.04042 0.401378 7.265724 -0.66499
73 Health Services/HMOs  0.009239 0.05844 0.311722 5.130782 -0.94865
74 Hospitals & Nursing Homes  0.013065 0.143302 0.786524 12.84946 0.003027
75 Recreation / Live Entertainment  0.001076 0.227285 2.159787 33.67901 -0.96086
76 Pro. Sports, Arenas & Services -0.01044 0.317798 1.6888 18.29463 -0.98352
77 Casinos / Gambling  -0.01418 0.997428 6.230898 73.7752 -0.99182
78 Lodging / Tourism  0.010332 0.120068 0.967639 18.06948 -0.67287
79 Food & Beverage  0.013242 0.747813 7.556043 123.9897 -0.00915
80 Restaurants & Drinking Estab. 0.013072 0.572412 5.953539 109.9623 -0.01678
81 Funeral Services  -0.00935 0.040275 0.558351 8.920427 -0.95182
82 Clergy & Religious Org. 0.012264 0.194785 2.239342 43.40306 -0.38699
85 Dairy -0.05071 -0.02621 0.761762 7.915258 -0.95061
86 Credit Unions  -0.02153 -0.02887 0.283135 2.524062 -0.93198
87 Chiropractors -0.02329 0.128114 1.055957 16.09229 -0.86591
88 Alternative Energy Prod. & Serv. 0.004994 5.081104 22.52629 252.5624 -0.92382
89 Nutritional & Dietary Suppl. -0.00925 11.75602 88.1422 1142.806 -0.9906
90 Miscellaneous Defense  -0.1663 3.234659 23.43151 257.0058 -0.99121
91 Airlines -0.00021 0.217039 1.317019 11.8743 -0.9523
92 Cruise Ships & Lines  -0.05962 17.6573 115.008 1021.937 -0.86756
93 Savings & Loans  -0.00504 0.068769 0.680088 11.04968 -0.89532
94 Mortgage Bankers & Brokers  -0.01088 0.063211 0.642486 7.040508 -0.9238
95 Venture Capital  -0.06702 0.297896 1.650266 15.34071 -0.99829
96 Nurses 0.012487 0.176465 1.220056 20.76419 -0.05182TABLE A1
Number of district-specific tests supporting the inverse-U 
hypothesis in reduced form using contributions to main 
candidate-contributions to challenger (net contributions, NC).
NC sd = κ d+δ d,1v sd+δ d,2v sd
2+µ sd All SIG
Tests within district d: 106th House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 387 out of 435
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 222 out of 435
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 178 out of 435
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 226 out of 435
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.023 (0.060)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 5.429 (3.493)
Note:  Standard errors robust at the electoral district level 
(congressional district for House). Number of SIG for 106th 
Congress is 86. The number of total regressions is equal to the 
number of seats in the House. The numbers in parentheses next 
to the mean peak of the fraction of population employed and the 
mean number of observations above the peak of the parabola are 
the corresponding std. deviations. TABLE A2
Number of district-specific tests supporting the inverse-U 
hypothesis in reduced form controlling for vote splitting.
C sd = κ d+δ d,1x sd+δ d,2x sd
2+µ sd All SIG
Tests within district d: 106th House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 420 out of 435
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 273 out of 435
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 216 out of 435
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 275 out of 435
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.019 (0.016)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 5.026 (2.013)
Note:  x = v deflated by fraction of contributions going to challenger. 
Standard errors robust at the electoral district level 
(congressional district for House). Number of SIG for 106th 
Congress is 86. The number of total regressions is equal to the 
number of seats in the House. The numbers in parentheses next 
to the mean peak of the fraction of population employed and the 
mean number of observations above the peak of the parabola are 
the corresponding std. deviations. TABLE A3
Number of district-specific tests supporting the inverse-U 
hypothesis in reduced form controlling for number of 
establishments.
C sd = 
κ d+δ d,1v sd+δ d,2v sd
2+ξ de sd+µ sd All SIG
Tests within district d: 106th House
Sign: δ1  > 0; δ2 < 0 374 out of 435
F-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 121 out of 435
t-test (0.05) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 76 out of 435
t-test (0.10) Ho: δ1 = 0 & Ho: δ2 = 0 124 out of 435
Mean Peak Fraction Employed (st.d.) 0.016 (0.057)
Mean # Obs. Above Peak (st.d.) 11.125 (8.767)
Sign: ξ  > 0 403 out of 435
t-test (0.05) Ho: ξ = 0 105 out of 435
Note:  Standard errors robust at the electoral district level 
(congressional district for House). Number of SIG for 106th 
Congress is 86. The number of total regressions is equal to the 
number of seats in the House. The numbers in parentheses next 
to the mean peak of the fraction of population employed and the 
mean number of observations above the peak of the parabola are 
the corresponding std. deviations. Number of establishment data 
are collected by the Economic Census and apportioned by 
district employing population weights.Figure 1 (a) 
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a = 1/150, b = 60000, g = 0
r = 180, e = 0
Figure 2 : Inverse-U relationship between votes and contributions
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